THE ROLE OF ANTIWAR PROTEST IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 1965-1970

by

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INTRODUCTION

For the past five or six years various aspects of interest articulation in the United States have been changing radically. Styles of articulation, communication channels utilized, the characteristics of those participating, the interest articulation structures involved, and the very position of interest articulation both in relation to the government and to the general public--in all these areas is evidenced the change that has been occurring. Indeed, some of the literature on interest articulation as recent as 1965-1966 seems pathetically inept in light of our experience since that time.[1] Also, though, there is much of value in some of the older literature. There is now a considerable need for renewed and intensive study on the nature of interest articulation from the mid-1960's on, integrating some of the older work with some of the more recent experience; hence, one reason for the present work.

The present study is limited to one area of the general topic of interest articulation on the foreign

policy issue of United States policy in Vietnam (and, for a brief time, in Cambodia) between January 1, 1965 and December 31, 1970. The main concern is with those people and groups which have commonly been referred to collectively as the "antiwar movement," "war protestors," or "peace movement"--that is, with those individuals and groups which in various ways sought to affect a change in United States military policy in Vietnam towards some degree of de-escalation. A more explicit description of this "body" of groups and people will be offered below.

From a broad perspective, the question of the significance of the war protest as a form of interest articulation underlies this study. With this are the somewhat less general questions concerning an analysis of the war protest movement and including: what the movement was in terms of its composition and purpose, what it responded to, and what responded to it. Along with an account of the performance of the war protest movement then, focus here is also upon the performances in other entities, such as public opinion on the war and Johnson and Nixon administration policy in Vietnam. Thus, while attention centers on the protest movement, for the most part, it is on the movement as an interest articulating

body as it exists in relation to several other factors. By examining and accounting for war protest in the context of several related factors, a basis for evaluating and determining the position and significance of the protest as a form of interest articulation within the American political system ought to emerge.

Three of four major relationships will be of primary concern here: that between the war protest and public opinion on the war, that between war protest and Johnson and Nixon administration activity on its war policy, and that between war protest and the policy itself. These relationships will be examined essentially with the assistance of quantitative analysis. A fourth major complementing relationship, between public opinion on the war and administration policy in Vietnam, will be dealt with in a limited way, descriptively. In order to achieve some perspective on these relationships, several other factors will be introduced including: acts of protest made abroad, domestic acts of support of the policy, news coverage on the war, and Congressional involvement in areas related to United States policy in Vietnam. For analysis, each of the factors will be incorporated into an elementary and somewhat classical (though modified) model, developed by

James Rosenau, relating public opinion, interest articulation, and foreign policy. Each factor, in turn, will be explicitly defined; and the criteria for the collection of data on the particular factor will be detailed. Following this, a perspective for accounting for war protest will be offered, in turn, to be followed by a brief survey of the war protest movement as it developed from late in 1964 through 1970. With this accomplished, several hypotheses concerning the significance of the war protest and related matters will be set forth and explained, the methods for testing them described, the results of the testing recounted, and the conclusions made.

Footnotes to Introduction

[1]Elements in Lester Milbrath's "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy" (in James N. Rosenau's Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy [New York: The Free Press, 1967]), such as his use of the example of letter writing as if it were one of the few means of interest articulation and his statement on the importance of putting demands in a polite and inviting manner exemplify that aspect of comparatively recent literature which seems somewhat alien to our own recent experience.

CHAPTER I

THE CONTEXT

In 1961, James N. Rosenau set forth what has become a classic model relating public opinion and foreign policy.[1] With some modification, a clarified version of that model (which remains fairly consistent with Rosenau) may be built which can accommodate many of the present concerns.

Originally, Rosenau, wanting to get away from the somewhat nebulous area of the flow of influence, devised a model to study the flow of expressed opinion between decision-makers, opinion-submitters, and opinion-makers and opinion-holders. He writes,

> It is useful to view the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy as being composed of three distinctly different, but closely related, social processes--that is, as three separate systems of interaction between discrete individuals. One is the governmental decision-making process through which foreign policy is formulated and into which existing public opinion is integrated by the officials responsible for the conduct of policy (. . . the decision-makers or policy-makers). Another is the opinion-submitting process that occurs whenever opinions are conveyed to or impressed upon decision-

> makers by individual members or segments of the public (. . . the opinion-submitters). And thirdly, there is the opinion-making process whereby ideas about foreign policy issues are formed and circulated in American society (through the interaction of what shall be referred to as opinion-holders and opinion-makers, the former being the entire citizenry and the latter those citizens who introduce opinions into the impersonal channels of the communications system).[2]

Rosenau's model appears in Figure 1.

The opinion-policy model functions for Rosenau in basically a descriptive way. To illustrate, in classical democratic theory, writes Rosenau, the relationship is 8--> 9--> 10, i.e., the public's opinion transmitted by opinion-submitters to the decision-makers. Yet there are deviations and alternatives to this classical pattern. For instance, the opinion-submitting process may be by-passed, with the decision-makers perceiving (whether intentionally or not) what Rosenau calls the general "climate" of opinion existing in the opinion-making process (1 and/or 2, on the model). Illustrating further, with a slight shift in one's role in one process, another relationship between the processes may be activated; e.g., decision-makers may play a role (intentionally or not) in opinion-making (thus, the sequence, 3,4,--> 8--> 9--> 10 or 3,4--> 1,2), or as with a congressman perhaps playing a

FIGURE 1. Rosenau's Opinion-Policy Model



role in facilitating opinion-submitting to the decision-making process as a result of his having explicitly solicited opinions (5--> 10).

The model as it stands contains certain limitations as well as an especially problematical ambiguity. For Rosenau there is a distinct group of opinion-makers in the public, separate from both decision-makers and opinion-submitters; opinion-makers occupy the realm of the opinion-making process along with the opinion-holders. Rosenau writes that opinion-makers are those who "occupy positions which enable them regularly to transmit, either locally or nationally, opinions about any issue to unknown persons outside of their occupational field or about more than one class of issues to unknown professional colleagues."[3] With this, too, both decision-makers and opinion-submitters can become opinion-makers. And here some ambiguity emerges as to the point at which decision-making or opinion-submitting may constitute opinion-making; that is, for instance, where the execution of the policy of bringing the troops home along with statements about it has a certain opinion-making nature. The notion of a specified, however heterogeneous, group of opinion-makers addressing themselves exclusively to opinion-holders is unacceptable especially when the

issue of United States policy in Vietnam is involved. On one hand, almost every opinion-making activity of this nature on this issue may be said to embody an opinion-submitting element. Additionally, the confusion is increased as a result of the potential ability of any of the three main groups (decision-makers, opinion-submitters, and opinion-holders) to play an opinion-making role; opinion-holders, simply by being polled and the poll being published, can conceivably be opinion-makers under Rosenau's definition of opinion-making--as the poll itself could have some relationship to subsequent changes in the majority opinion, for example.

In addition to the problems inherent in trying to isolate opinion-makers, there are limitations with the notion of the flow of expressed opinion. Initially, Rosenau is concerned with devising a descriptive conceptual model, devoid of causal agency, and dealing thus with the flow of opinion rather than of influence. Influence is nebulous, and it does not always flow together with opinion. Yet, from the present perspective, expressed opinion as the only flowing unit in the opinion-policy relationship is inadequate. From the descriptive point of view, not only is expressed opinion involved but also

simple actions (activities or occurrences) which can be similarly viewed apart from the question of influence, are integrally involved as well. This is indicated implicitly in an above example dealing with the execution of policy. Or, as another instance, the level of congressional activity, say, in debating a date for the termination of United States military activity in Vietnam--the level of this activity (activity which naturally and implicitly involves opinions) may relate to the level of opinion approving of the handling of the war. The old adage of actions speaking louder than words is vital here to the opinion-policy relationship. Similarly, changes in the number of Americans killed in action during a particular period might relate, descriptively, to changes in the level of opinion approving. From a descriptive point of view, it might be noted that as casualties decreased in a particular period, public approval on the war policy increased. And often in a particular area, a person may do something in regard to a matter rather than simply express an explicit opinion about it. Thus, expressed opinion as the sole unit in the opinion-policy relationship is insufficient; account must be taken of occurrences or actions as well.

Two basic modifications in the model are therefore in order. First, all people and groups are to be regarded as both opinion-holders and opinion-makers. There is to be no distinct class of opinion-makers. Although all are opinion-holders and opinion-makers, a small number of people additionally are either opinion-submitters or decision-makers; and these are members of the opinion-submitting process and decision-making process, respectively. Those who are in neither of these two processes remain in Rosenau's "opinion-making process," the name of which might best be changed now to simply the "opinion-holders." Among the opinion-holders are Rosenau's distinction (originally derived from Gabriel Almond) between the attentive public (making up approximately 10 per cent of the adult population and characterized by both its prevalent structured opinions and its inclinations towards participating in what now becomes the opinion-submitting process) and the mass public (estimated at 75-90 per cent of the adult population and characterized by its being generally uninformed, lacking both initiative and structured opinions on foreign policy issues, and exhibiting a predominant mood of indifference and passivity with respect to foreign policy issues).[4] A second modification

in the model, briefly, is that in addition to expressed opinions as units in the opinion-policy relationship, what might be termed either "actions," "activities," "occurrences," or "events" be included as well; this will be further clarified below.

Furthermore, Rosenau's model may be expanded in two areas. First, the area of "Foreign Policy" ought to be expanded upon as this, as an area in itself, seems to be significantly related to the other three main processes. To elaborate: Developments in foreign policy (such as fluctuations in battlefield casualties, war costs, or draft calls) can be seen as important to fluctuations in other areas of the overall opinion-policy relationship. War costs might be seen as relating to the level of opinion-submitting. And with the expanded foreign policy area, channels for perception (identical to the types already existing) would be established linking each of the three main processes to foreign policy. Second, an area or process for news coverage may be introduced into the model. Such a process would be engaged both in perceiving and reporting developments in each of the other (now) four processes (requiring the creation of more channels for perception to each of the four). Its reporting events

would be in addition to expressing opinions (its only function in Rosenau's scheme). In turn, developments in "news coverage" process would be perceived by each of the original three processes (and this too would require additional channels for perception by the three processes).

Despite these modifications and expansions, Rosenau's model, both conceptual and descriptive, still functions according to the same basic principles and in the same manner.

The several factors of concern in this study and mentioned in the introduction may now be placed in the modified model and the model re-presented. Beginning in the area now termed "Opinion-Holders" all data of American public opinion on United States military policy in Vietnam during the period is to be located. Four basic questions on this matter were asked with some frequency during this time, and the results of these polls may be placed here. In the Opinion-Submitting process (henceforth to be seen as synonymous with the interest articulation process) are to be placed three groups including: (1) the war protesters, (2) the domestic supporters of the policy, and (3) the foreign war protesters. The Decision-Making process is to be composed of two basic groups: (1) United

States Congressional activity, and (2) Johnson and Nixon administration activity on the policy. In the new fourth area, Foreign Policy, are to be located two variables: (1) number of Americans killed in action in Vietnam, and (2) draft calls. Finally, in the process of News Coverage are located spaces for both the New York Times and Los Angeles Times, each constituting a further variable. The Opinion-Policy Model now appears as shown in Figure 2.

This, then, completes the creation of the overall context with which the relationships among the several factors are to be examined. Again, to repeat, chief focus is upon the peace movement, especially as it relates to the administration, the policy, and public opinion on the war. The other factors are introduced in order to achieve better perspective. And it is all of the factors to which attention now turns.

FIGURE 2. Modified Opinion-Policy Model



Footnotes to Chapter I

[1]James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961).

[2]Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[3]Ibid., p. 45.

[4]Ibid., pp. 35-41.

CHAPTER II

THE VARIABLES

In order to make the model operative and thus make possible analysis of both the major and minor relationships between the factors or variables of the model, explicit definitions for each variable are to be established; and this is to be done in conjunction with the setting forth of rigorous criteria for the collection of data for each variable. On this matter, the following definitions and criteria are employed for each of the variables.

A. Acts of War Protest (VTP)

1. The actors include all those individuals and groups who during the period expressed opposition to various or all aspects of United States military involvement in Vietnam and who sought to affect a change in that area towards de-militarization and de-escalation. These individuals and groups who make up the Vietnam war protest movement are henceforth referred to collectively as VTP.

2. An act of protest or criticism has to involve two key elements: (a) some manner of advocation of de-escalation, and (b) the object of reference being United States policy (military involvement) in Vietnam.

3. Acts of protest are collected from the New York Times Index, January 1, 1965 to December 31, 1970. It is assumed that a valid sample of these acts can be derived from this source. For the period January 1, 1965 through December 31, 1966, data are collected from under the general headings: "U.S. Armament--Draft, Recruitment, Mobilization" and "Vietnam--General Policies." For the period January 1, 1967 through April 30, 1970, data are collected from under the two headings: "Vietnam--General Policies, Reactions in U.S." and "U.S. Armament--Draft, Recruitment, Mobilization." From May 1, 1970 through December 31, 1970, data are collected from under these two headings in addition to the heading "Vietnam--General Policies."

4. Each article reporting one act is regarded as one act. Thus, for example, five articles on the same act (say, the Pentagon March of October 1967) would in effect be counted as five acts. By doing this--and not doing this seems methodologically impossible--a form of "weight-

ing" emerges, thus giving some measure of significance to acts which were commonly regarded as more important than others.

5. When two or more distinct acts, involving different actors at different places, are reported in the same article, each act is counted. Various comments, characteristics, or descriptions concerning the same act reported in one article equals (is counted as) only one act.

6. An act is counted on the day of its being reported. An act committed on June 13th, reported on June 14th, is recorded for the later date.

7. (a) If the main act being reported is not a VTP act, but contains a reference to one, then the VTP act referred to is counted. (b) If the main act being reported is a VTP act and also contains a reference to the commission of another VTP act, then both are taken. (c) If the main act refers to more than one distinct VTP act, each distinct act referred to is taken.

8. Acts committed involving a number of issues including the war (e.g., Century Plaza, July 1967) are counted within VTP.

9. An editorial or letter-to-the-editor fulfilling the various criteria here is included as a VTP act.

10. The reporting or review of an art form (such as a piece of literature, a song, a singer's performance, a film, an art exhibit, and so on), if the art form satisfies the various relevant criteria here, is counted as a VTP act.

11. A VTP type action against a non-United States government supporter of the policy--including business corporations such as Dow Chemical or a foreign dignitary such as Japan's Prime Minister Sato at Columbia University --is counted where the issue of United States military involvement in Vietnam is explicitly involved.

12. The reporting of a poll involving a manner of VTP protest, i.e., people recording their views opposed to United States policy and favoring de-escalation, is counted as an act of protest.

13. Any form of resistance to the military--including emigration to avoid induction, anti-ROTC activity, draft-card burning, a draft board invasion or bombing --is included within VTP as United States involvement in Vietnam is assumed to have been implicitly involved (as an object of protest) at the time the act was planned and

taken. An attack on the military-industrial complex itself, without reference to the issue of United States policy in Vietnam, is not counted; one could be critical of the former without being critical of the latter. Similarly, criticism of the draft per se is not included within VTP; if such a criticism were to include a reference to a case of draft resistance, say, the reference would be counted as one VTP act.

14. The action of a court or lawyer or legal organization in relation to a VTP act is never counted as a VTP act and is simply regarded as being neutral. A lawyer defending one who has refused induction, the United States Supreme Court upholding a case of conscientious objection, the ACLU stating it will go out of its way to defend those accused of violating draft laws--not one of these acts by the lawyer, court, or ACLU would be counted as a VTP act; each is seen as a neutral act.

15. It is assumed that the decision-makers on United States policy in Vietnam were few in number. Thus, one could on occasion be a participant or member of VTP while working for the United States government; for example, an act of protest by a Peace Corps volunteer would be counted as a VTP act. Some would argue that a few

Senators and Congressmen as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee became so detached and alienated from the decision-making process on the policy that they assumed characteristics similar to those outside of government and within VTP and that they (the Congressmen and so on) should be regarded as VTP members when taking VTP-type actions. Partly because of the indexing methods of the New York Times on this and also because of the nature of the developing policy, the activities of government officials when satisfying the relevant criteria here are included within VTP from January 1, 1967 through December 31, 1970, when listed under the third and fourth headings mentioned in Number 3, above. And, the number of these, it should be emphasized, are very few under these particular headings. VTP type acts taken by government officials in the first two years are almost wholly excluded from VTP.

16. Any action by a political candidate, or a "peace candidate," when reported under one of the above headings and explicitly involving United States policy in Vietnam and satisfying the other criteria, is included as a VTP act.

17. Related to Number 5 above, occasionally there are several similar--almost identical--actions reported in one article, which fall within the realm of VTP. For example, several prominent citizens will be listed as having signed a particular statement of protest; or, as another instance, in the immediate aftermath of the Cambodian invasion, in one article there appeared the statements and comments of several Congressmen and Senators and other citizens calling for de-escalation and withdrawal. In these two instances, the actions assumed a character of a class action or group action--being quite similar to a specific action of a protest group (such as Women Strike for Peace marching in front of the White House--and counted as one act). At the same time, these two instances seem to be distinct from the situation in Number 5, above (i.e., two or more distinct acts, involving different actors in different places, reported in the same article). Consequently, actions of the above type--approaching class or group actions--are counted as <u>one</u>. Yet, as in the Cambodian invasion aftermath, when one article listed the several universities at which VTP actions were taken, each university listed as having

engaged in protest is counted--this being more in accord with Number 5 above.

18. For the period May 1, 1970 through June 30, 1970, the object of VTP protest is United States military involvement in Cambodia as well as Vietnam.

19. Criticism of American war atrocities (e.g., at Son My) in itself is not included within VTP.

20. VTP acts are categorized/characterized according to four basic types: (I) Legal and Nonviolent, (II) Illegal and Nonviolent, (III) Violent, (IV) Illegal and Violent. The elementary definitions for these basic terms follow:

a) Violent--involving physical injury to person and/or physical damage to property.

b) Nonviolent--no physical injury to person and no physical damage to property involved.

c) Legal--an act is assumed to be legal until the one who performed the act is proven guilty in court.

d) Illegal--when one who committed act is convicted in court, that act is regarded as illegal.

If more than one of these types is involved in a group action, then a category is designated for this. A special case: An act of emigration to avoid induction or the

taking of sanctuary within a church to avoid induction or prosecution for some other form of protest is considered as being of Type II above (Illegal-Nonviolent). As the data are finally analyzed, these are considered according to two basic types: I and II-III-IV-V.

All of these acts of war protest occupy a position within the Opinion-Submitting process, as do the foreign acts of protest, the definition and criteria for which follow.

B. Foreign Acts of Protest (FOR)

1. From the criteria for "Acts of War Protest" above, the following apply for foreign acts of protest as well: Numbers 2, 4-12, and 17-20.

2. Foreign VTP actors share the same characteristics with the exception, obviously, that the foreign VTP people and groups are not United States citizens or United States based.

3. Data are collected from under the same headings from which United States domestic VTP data are collected, with the one exception: for the period January 1, 1967 through April 30, 1970, the heading "Vietnam--General Policies, Reactions Abroad" replaces "Vietnam--General

Policies, Reactions in U.S." It is again assumed that a valid sample for such acts can be derived from this source.

4. The acts of the type described under Number 13, for the domestic VTP criteria, do not occur abroad in the same manner as in the United States. Abroad, indirect yet supportive acts may be taken as a form of protest in assisting those Americans who are engaged in military resistance. Such acts of assistance are accounted for here as falling within VTP (foreign), and of the same general nature as those of Number 13.

5. Acts of protest taken at the official, governmental level abroad are counted only for the period after January 1, 1967, and only when these are reported (in very exceptional cases) under one of the above headings.

C. War Supporters' Acts (SUP)

1. The actors here include all those individuals and groups who during the period expressed support for various or all aspects of United States military involvement in Vietnam and/or urged further escalation or militarization of the policy.

2. Criteria 4-12, 17, and 18 of the criteria for collecting "Acts of War Protest" are in operation here

when at the appropriate places "supporters" is substituted for "VTP," and "act of support" is substituted for "VTP action" and similar terms and phrases related to the supporters are substituted for those like terms related to VTP.

3. An act of support involves two elements: (a) some manner of advocation of support and/or escalation, and (b) the object of reference being United States policy (military involvement) in Vietnam.

4. Data are collected from the New York Times Index from under the following headings, again with the assumption that a valid sample can be obtained with this source. For January 1, 1965 through December 31, 1966, "Vietnam--General Policies." For January 1, 1967 through December 31, 1970, "Vietnam--General Policies, Reactions in U.S." From May 1, 1970 through December 31, 1970, data are collected from the additional heading, "Vietnam--General Policies," as well.

5. In a rare instance when the supporting act of a government official is recorded under the above headings after December 31, 1966, this is counted. The same applies to supporting acts of political candidates.

6. Acts of support are characterized in the same manner as VTP acts (Number 20 above).

7. In line with Number 7a of the first set of criteria, by which references to VTP acts are counted, in a similar way any reference to "the silent majority" reported in an article is counted as one act of support.

D. Levels for Opinion-Holders (HAN, MIS, HK-DV, PRS)

The process or area of the model now termed "Opinion-Holders" is composed of four sections of data taken from public opinion polls. These polls were conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion. During the period under study, four questions were asked with some frequency dealing with public opinion on the war. These include the following:

1. "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Johnson/President Nixon is handling [or dealing with] the situation in Vietnam? Approve, Disapprove, No Opinion." This question was asked fifty-one times during the period, yet only twice in 1968. (HAN)

2. "People are called 'hawks' if they want to step up our military efforts in Vietnam. They are called 'doves' if they want to reduce our military effort in

Vietnam. How would you describe yourself--'hawk' or 'dove'? Hawk, Dove, No Opinion." This question, the data for which may supplement the gap in the data for question 1, was asked seven times from December, 1967 through 1968. (HK-DV)

3. "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam? Yes, No, No Opinion." This question was asked somewhat less frequently, twenty times in the six years, and only once in 1969. (MIS)

4. "Do you approve of the way Johnson [replaced by Nixon in mid-January, 1969] is handling his job as President? Approve, Disapprove, No Opinion." The basis for the inclusion of this question relates to the fairly consistent centrality of the Vietnam war issue to Presidential popularity throughout the period. With two exceptions in the six-year period, the Vietnam war was named most often as the nation's top problem by persons interviewed by the American Institute of Public Opinion; in the early summer of 1968 the radial situation was named as often as the war[1] and in the early summer of 1970 student protests replaced the war as the most important issue

named facing the nation.[2] A further basis for this question's inclusion derives from the frequency with which it was asked: eighty-seven times in the period. (PRS)

E. Levels for Decision-Makers (ADM, CON)

In the "Decision-Making Process" of the model, two factors are located. First, in the central position of this area is located Johnson and Nixon administration activity on the war policy. Data for this consist of all statements made of a positive, negative, or neutral nature by administration officials on developments in the war policy. Included were statements by the President on down to lower administration officials (such as State and Defense Department officials). Excluded were statements by military officials. Also excluded were Defense Department statements on casualties and plane and helicopter losses and Defense Department accounts confined solely to descriptions of battlefield action and lacking any judgmental or critical aspect. Statements relating to both the validity and progress of the policy are of main concern in the collection of data on this matter. Each statement is counted as one. The source for these data is the New York Times Index: for 1965-1966, from the heading

"Vietnam--General Policies," and for 1967-1970, from the heading "Vietnam--General Policies of Belligerants, Other Major Powers." It is assumed, again, that a valid sample of these statements can be obtained from this source.

Occupying a slightly remote area of the Decision-Making process is the variable Congressional involvement with United States policy in Vietnam taken by the United States Congress in either Committee meeting or on the floor of the Senate or House is accounted for. The index of the Congressional Record's Daily Digest is the source used to determine the level of Congressional activity during the period. The following headlines are checked for each year:

Vietnam (and all other sections referred to at this point)

Southeast Asia

Appropriations--Vietnam

Armed Forces--Vietnam

Asia-China Policy

Foreign Aid--Authorization, supplemental

Vietnam Expenditures

Vietnam Land Reform

All references under these headings were checked for

Congressional involvement with United States policy in Vietnam. Each committee meeting concerned with this is accounted for, for the particular date of the hearing; each meeting is given an automatic weight of "10." And the number of pages of the Congressional Record for a particular day dealing with the matter, as indicated by the index, is accounted for; each page of the Record counts as "1."

F. Foreign Policy (KIL, DRAFT)

In the area "Foreign Policy," two factors are included. First, the number of Americans killed in action in Vietnam; figures for this were given weekly by the Department of Defense beginning on June 25, 1965. Second, draft calls, figures for which were issued monthly throughout the period by the Department of Defense, are used. It is assumed that these two figures constitute a valid reflection of the course of the war policy as it developed during the six years.

G. News Coverage (NYT, LAT)

Finally, in the area "News Coverage," two factors are used: front page news coverage of the war and related matters of both the New York Times and the Los Angeles

Times. Every story (i.e., individual dateline), photograph, map, and chart are given the numerical value of 1. Each story, photograph, map, and chart relating to United States policy in Vietnam (and for May-June, 1970: Cambodia) appearing on every front page are accounted for. Virtually anything concerning Vietnam is seen as relating to United States policy; thus, any of the above, explicitly concerned in some way with Vietnam, is accounted for here. If there is some doubt upon reading the headline of the story as to whether it concerns Vietnam, the article's first paragraph is scanned; and if there is no mention of Vietnam there, the article is not counted. A major headline story on Vietnam is separately counted, thus enabling the weighting of such an item with a value of "2." With the Los Angeles Times, headlines are easily distinguishable, usually appearing in five-eighth inch print in the upper right hand corner. The New York Times rarely runs a major headline; yet when it does, at least one-half inch type is used with the headline occupying at least three columns.

This completes the definitional descriptions of each of the several variables and the setting forth of the criteria with which data for the variables are collected.

For every variable except those relating to public opinion, draft calls, and casualties, data are collected on a day to day basis. Subsequently, data collected on a daily basis are summed on a weekly basis. Casualty figures already exist on a weekly basis. Draft call figures, existing on a monthly basis, are broken down to a weekly basis. For the most part, this can be done simply by dividing the figure by four (for the number of dates indicating a week ending during a month). Occasionally, where there are five such dates, the figure is divided by five and the last (weekly) figure for the five-week month is averaged with the first weekly figure of the following month, and these two averaged figures are used for these two weeks in order to assure some continuity and balance between two consecutive months having an unequal number of dates for weeks ending. Weekly values for the opinion data are derived from determining the average value between each two points of the opinion figures. By doing this, rather than looking at the trend of opinion over several points and determining appropriate opinion values, at the missing points, opinion values are kept within the limits determined by any two consecutive continual points. For instance, if for week$_1$ opinion

measured 48 and for $week_4$ it measured 44, $weeks_{2-3}$ are assigned the values 46--thus, not exceeding the values of the bounding measures and thereby not introducing a potential distortion by assigning a value outside of the 44-48 range. All of the data for the variables, as they are used for analysis in the following chapters, may be found in the Appendix.

Footnotes to Chapter II

[1]George Gallup, "Public Opinion and the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," Opinion Index (American Institute of Public Opinion, October, 1969).

[2]Milton J. Rosenberg, Signey Verba, and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 44.

CHAPTER III

SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAR PROTEST 1965-1970

In order to facilitate later analysis, some attention ought to be given to the war protest movement itself as it developed over the six years. The purpose of this section is to obtain some understanding of VTP's composition (both in terms of individuals and groups, and their characteristics), the styles of interest articulation which it exhibited, the communication channels it utilized, and the general sense of purpose with which it operated. If some perspective on these matters can be established, a deeper understanding of how VTP related to other areas of Rosenau's model hopefully may be obtained.

With regard to developing an overall perspective on the antiwar movement while simultaneously accounting for its variety to some degree, very little systematic work has been done. Most studies related to this area have been confined to either particular aspects of war

protest or war protest as a part of a larger phenomenon. The extended and descriptive bibliography compiled by the Scranton Commission on Campus Unrest illustrates this well.[1] On one hand, there are works such as Kenneth Keniston's 1968 study on antiwar activities undertaken by youth in the summer of 1967, Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth. On the other hand, Seymour M. Lipset and Philip G. Altbach's anthology, Students in Revolt, surveying student political movements throughout the world since World War II and reflecting a very broad perspective, is an example.

In cases where the attempt has been made to deal with VTP entirely, the careful application of a systematic framework for analysis or description is lacking. A large portion of the Skolnick Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, entitled The Politics of Protest,[2] deals in a comprehensive manner with antiwar protest. The Report suggests at least three ways for analysing VTP, including the following: (a) in terms of tactics, under which two basic groups existed within VTP, "those for whom tactics are chiefly a moral question and those who see tactics chiefly as means to political ends";[3] (b) in terms of the social bases and social

composition of the movement; and (c) somewhat descriptively (and nebulously), in terms of the movement's disorganization (its various ad hoc groups and coalitions which "made" it up). In a comparatively early study, Newsweek magazine (July, 1967) attempted to impose on the movement another type of framework (which was probably more valid at that time and which has nevertheless contributed to understanding the evolution of VTP), by grouping its elements into four schools of thought. These consisted of (a) the New Left, whose members simply held the view that "the war is wrong and Ho Chi Minh is right"; (b) the Anti-ideologues, who believed that the United States was waging a "holy war" in Vietnam against the specter of a monolithic world Communist threat which simply did not exist; (c) the Self-Determination schools (adhered to by most intellectuals) who believed that "the Vietnamese ought to be left free to work out their own problems without intervention from abroad"; and (d) the Realpolitik school (with Hans Morgenthau as a leading spokesman) which held the view that regardless of the morality of the Vietnam situation, the United States grossly miscalculated the cold equations of power politics and overcommitted itself in an area where its power was restricted and its chances for ultimate

success were almost nil.[4] A similar scheme, expanded and modified though containing some of the same basic elements, could be developed with little difficulty to account for the balance of the period as well. A third major scheme for looking at the peace movement has been used by both the Skolnick Report, in part, and Raymond Tanter in a stimulating article on "International War and Domestic Turmoil"[5] (which will be of concern, below). Both of these (the latter deriving his data from the related unpublished work of Irving L. Horowitz) view war protest exclusively in terms of mass demonstrations (composed of at least a thousand participants).

Another somewhat systematic way to view war protest is, quite simply, chronologically. And this has been one element of the method used here. With this, and in order to be able to incorporate some depth for Variable Number 1, VTP, the following analytical framework is employed. If, according to the assumption made here, VTP is to be perceived as primarily having been involved with interest articulation, a systematic framework which can accommodate this basic nature of VTP ought to be used. Analyzing VTP exclusively in terms of the nature of tactics employed, or a particular tactic employed (e.g., mass demonstra-

tions), or in terms of ideologies represented, or social composition, is inadequate; much is excluded of the basic composition of the protest movement which such is done. Consequently, use is made here of Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell's theoretical analysis of the process of interest articulation, an analysis which provides a framework that may account for several elements of interest articulation. Much more of the war protest movement may be seen and accounted for with the use of this framework. If, as the Skolnick Report suggests, antiwar protest has "almost acquired the status of an institution" in the United States,[6] then such a framework is vital.

Almond and Powell's Framework

Almond and Powell's discussion of interest articulation comprises the following points which are pertinent to the purposes here.[7]

Beginning at an especially elementary level, they write that every political system has some way of processing demands. "Interest articulation" refers to the process by which individuals and groups make demands upon the political decision-makers. Immediately involved with this process are interest articulation structures. Almond

and Powell list five major types of structures; all are listed here as each type existed, with some variation, during the course of the movement. The first type is most distinct: individual self-representation. With this individuals may be articulators of their own interests; these interests may be "cast in the guise of more general societal or group interests" and/or they may involve "the articulation of interest perceived as noble in scope."[8] The other four types are subsumed under the general category of "interest groups." The definition provided is this:

> By "interest group" we mean a group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds. The structure of the interest group may be organized to include continuing role performance by all members of the group, or it may reflect only occasional and intermittent awareness of the group interest on the part of individuals.[9]

Following are the four types of interest groups:

Anomic.--These are "the more or less spontaneous penetrations into the political system from the society, such as riots and demonstrations";[10] and these are characterized by limited organization and a lack of constant activity on behalf of the group.

Nonassociational.--According to Almond and Powell, these usually refer to kinship, ethnic, regional, and class groups from which interests are articulated by individuals, cliques, family and religious heads, and so on; however, the distinguishing characteristics of these--namely, "the absence of an organized procedure for establishing the nature and means of articulation, and the lack of continuity in internal structure"--apply very well to some elements of the antiwar movement; and this type is therefore included here.

Institutional.--These are a more developed form of the nonassociational type and are found within such organizations as political parties, legislatures, armies, churches, and so on; these are formal organizations, employing professional personnel with specific political or social functions other than interest articulation; such groups may represent either their own interests or those of other groups in the society.

Associational.--Examples of this type include trade unions, associations of businessmen, associations organized by religious denominations, and civic groups. These are designed to explicitly represent a particular

group's interests, and are distinguished by a full-time professional staff with orderly procedures for formulating interests and demands.

Two other areas of interest articulation may also be examined briefly before attention is turned to the movement itself. Initially, it should be seen that political communication is practically at the heart of the subject of interest articulation. One matter related to political communication concerns the types of political communication structures (i.e., channels) available for expressing political demands. Almond and Powell list four types of these: (1) physical demonstrations and violence; (2) personal connection; (3) elite representation (e.g., a member of a group may have a member in a policy making structure, or there may be a sympathetic individual or group within the policy making structures); and (4) formal and institutional channels of access (which include the mass media, political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, and cabinets).[11]

The other matter relating to political communication concerns the types of styles exhibited in interest articulation.* These types are listed in pairs, and following are those which apply to the protest movement:

(1a) manifest interest articulation (an explicit formulation of a demand) and (1b) latent, taking the form of behavioral or mood cues, of which cognizance may be taken at the decision making level; (2a) specific demands (e.g., "here is a 23-point peace plan") as contrasted with (2b) diffuse demands (e.g., "Peace Now!"); (3a) affective demands (which may express gratitude, hope, anger, or disappointment) and (3b) instrumental articulation (which may take the form of a bargain with the consequences set forth); and (4a) a pragmatic type of demand as contrasted with (4b) an ideological one.[12] It should be noted that actions taken in articulating interest can exhibit more than one of these styles. And overall, quite obviously, there is a potentially large number of possible combinations of operating structures, communications channels used, and styles exhibited.

The Antiwar Movement

The antiwar movement may be accounted for in the context of this framework. During the first years of antiwar activities, this task could be accomplished with relative ease; United States military policy in Vietnam, as an issue in itself, was nearly always very apparent in

any form of protest. As years passed, and the war continued, the war as the object of protest was not always as apparent as earlier. A chief reason for this derived from the fact, established by the Skolnick study, that the peace movement was composed predominantly of teachers, students, and clergy.[13] With this some of the points made by the Scranton Commission may be mentioned. For the period under study, the war as an object of protest existed simultaneously with the issues of racial injustice and the nature of the university. Each issue was approached similarly, in moral terms (for instance) or in terms of the ideals of liberalism; and, each question was considered from within the same environment, the campus. With little or no progress being made in these areas over the years, the distinctness of each issue from the others lessened. To illustrate, the Scranton Commission reports,

> As opposition to the war grew and the war continued to escalate, explanations of America's involvement in it became more radical. From having been a "mistake," the war was soon interpreted by radical students as a logical outcome of the American political system. They argued that what was most objectionable was not the war itself, but rather "the system" that had entered, justified, and pursued it. According to this logic, the appropriate target of protest was "the system" itself, and especially those parts of it that were involved in the war. The university, too, came to be seen as

> part of "the system," and therefore it became a target--as distinct from an accidental arena--of antiwar protest. . . .
>
> As the escalation of the war in Vietnam proceeded and as a radical analysis of the wider society evolved, few campus issues were seen as not related to the basic problems of the nation.[14]

And thus, there was a tendency for the confusion of these issues which, in turn, tended to be increased further with the evolution of (what Theodore Roszak termed) the counter-culture. "As the subculture coalesced . . . ," the Scranton Report adds, "student protest became less and less the result of specific issues or events, and more and more the expression of a generalized animus against the larger society."[15]

The main implication of this phenomenon is that a probably legitimate part of war protest, in Almond and Powell's terms latent interest articulation (that taking the form of one's behavior or mood), is necessarily excluded from VTP according to the criteria for acts of protest listed above. The behavioral phenomenon of young people "dropping out" via drug abuse, mysticism, a return to nature, immigration to other countries in substantial numbers,[16] or whatever, probably contained some element of war protest. Such behavior, in itself, is not accounted for here, however. Similarly, actions by groups such as

the "Crazies" who emerged on campus in the early Spring of 1969 and engaged in what many considered needless disruption of classes and destruction of university property, are not included within VTP.

The antiwar movement is thus accounted for here in terms of the above criteria--which involve for the most part the explicit presence of the issue of United States policy in Vietnam--in conjunction with Almond and Powell's framework on interest articulation.

Throughout 1964 there were only a few scattered instances of individual opposition to an increased American military involvement in Vietnam. Examples included Walter Lippmann in his magazine column, Roger Hilsman (who had since left his post as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs), and Norman Thomas. The Skolnick Report says that there was a "good deal of scattered protest" in 1964, though it does not elaborate.[17] The Scranton Commission reports that slightly more than one-fifth of campus protest in the school year 1964-1965 concerned the war issue; and this seems to be a more accurate account, at least in terms of VTP activity reported.[18] The first semi-organized opposition, reported on a large

scale, appeared in December, 1964, with 105 religious leaders sending a letter to President Johnson urging him to seek a negotiated peace, a large number of prominent citizens in Boston running an advertisement in the Boston Globe calling for a cease-fire in the military action, and Joan Baez conducting a protest rally at Berkeley (attended by 800 students)--a rally following in the manner of Berkeley's developing Free Speech Movement. Within the first month of 1965, opposition gradually mounted; and elements within it became more organized. And as American war efforts were escalated from 1965 to 1968, opposition became more intense.

Of significance to the nature of the peace movement and its beginnings is a background area: developments within the American political system related to the Vietnam policy. Vietnam was not of special significance in American politics until the Buddhist crisis of May, 1963, at which time a reassessment was begun on policy in that area with President Kennedy assuming (perhaps for the first time) an active role. According to the published views, close to that time, of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Roger Hilsman, and Theodore Sorenson,[19] the future of American policy was still uncertain when Diem was assassi-

nated on November 1, 1963 and his regime overthrown and Kennedy was assassinated three weeks later. At the time of Kennedy's death, the ratio of United States military personnel (aides and technicians) in Vietnam to the South Vietnamese population was practically the same ratio that had existed in Laos in 1962, at the time of the Laotian settlement. Because of developments in Vietnam and the United States presidential elections, Vietnam was a major issue in 1964. Johnson, opposed to Goldwater, was generally considered as the "peace candidate" and was elected. In August, 1964, following the Tonkin Gulf incident, both houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution authorizing the President to take the steps he deemed necessary "to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."[20] From the perspective of those outside the government, the direction United States policy would take remained uncertain until very late in 1964 and early in 1965; if anything, a massive American militarization of the war was not expected. In early 1965 when bombing of North Vietnam was begun on a regular basis, organized opposition began to emerge. Prior to this time, opposition to an increased military role existed largely within the

government. Also, of note, is the fact that by early 1965 Congress had already taken what would be its major action in determining United States policy: the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of five months earlier.

Interest articulation structures involved.--A chief characteristic of the movement, as a whole, during the period, was its relative fragmentation. Each of the five types of interest articulating structures existed in the course of the movement both on and off campus.

In addition to those people mentioned above, there were numerous cases of individual self-representation. A wide variety of examples is easily cited, and may include: Norman Cousins, Lieutenant General (Retired) James N. Gavin, George Kennan, Mulhamed Ali, Martin Luther King, Jr., Benjamin Spock, William Sloan Coffin, Stokeley Carmichael, Mitchell Goodman, Rennie Davis, Norman Mailer, Eartha Kitt, David Douglas Duncan, Daniel and Phillip Berrigan, Dick Gregory. Similarly, that antiwar activity involved anomic elements is easily demonstrated by pointing to numerous rallies and marches. The Walker Report, Rights in Conflict, dealing with the 1968 Chicago demonstrations, quotes Eric Weinberger, a representative to the

(1968) National Mobilization's Administrative Committee, as saying:

> . . . The people come out [for the marches], but we don't know who they are. The vast, vast majority of these people are on nobody's mailing list. They want to come out two, three times a year and make their feelings known.[21]

The following "communities" may be listed as having contributed "members" to this anomic structure: the general public, the intellectual community, the academic community, the religious community, and the black community.

Nonassociational groups are very close to the anomic structure as ethnic, status, regional, or class groups make them up. If emphasis is placed on their distinguishing characteristics noted above (the lack of internal structure and organized procedure for interest articulation), then some distinction is achieved. Regarding what it terms the Berkeley Invention (the first major model of protest developed in the 1960's), the Scranton Commission writes,

> The radical and liberal leaders were linked to the mass of demonstrators not by organization ties or formal mechanisms but rather by common participation in the movement. Unlike traditional campus political organizations, but like the civil rights movement, the FSM emphasized reaching decision by group consensus and mass meetings and avoided bureaucratic organization. At the same time, key

> tactical decisions were made at critical moments by a small group of leaders who directed the movement.[22]

Several of the coalitions of antiwar groups may be seen as nonassociational, including the Vietnam Day Committee (1965-1966), the May Second Movement (1965-1966), the Spring Mobilization Coalition (1967-1968), the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (1967-1968), the Coalition for an Open Convention (1968), and the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam ("The Mobe") (1969). The National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, for instance, had been formed to replace the Spring National Mobilization Committee in April, 1967. In some respects, it had both associational and nonassociational characteristics; its "organization" and the means it used for articulation fluctuated. Its Administrative Committee (composed of representatives from peace organizations throughout the country) elected its own officers; and the officers, with the Committee, "directed" the organization. National Mobilization was the instrumental group behind the Pentagon March and was one of the three main groups which organized the demonstrations at Chicago. In the first months of 1968, it started putting together a coalition of 150 antiwar groups to

participate in the Chicago demonstrations; at the time of the Pentagon (and Chicago) events, National Mobilization assumed more of a nonassociational character, by virtue of its being a coalition and its adoption of different kinds of tactics in order that as many groups as possible could be accommodated.

Additionally, various individual groups may be categorized as nonassociational. The Youth International Party ("Yippies"), the Radical Organizing Committee (1968), The Resistance (emerging in 1967), and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (created in 1962) may be included here. The SDS had nonassociational characteristics, as a liberal-radical-socialist coalition and basically an amorphous group of the generally termed New Left. It provided some means of antiwar coordination among sixty colleges in 1965 (though this was not its only function) and among more colleges subsequently. As of May, 1968, SDS had a membership of 35,000 (predominantly students), had an annual budget of $90,000, and was very loosely administered by three National Secretaries. The group was chiefly characterized by the fact that no two of its chapters on campuses were alike.[23] In 1969, it split into two equally amorphous factions and membership subsequently

declined.

Among institutional structures, for purposes of illustration, were the McCarthy and Kennedy/McGovern Presidential campaigns of 1968, Dissenting Democrats, various university administrations (as a result of their noncooperation with the Selective Service System), the Progressive Labor Party, the Communist Party, the Young Socialist Party, the California Democratic Council, the National Council of Churches, the National Conference of Concerned Democrats, the American Friends Service Committee.

Most groups involved in war protest were associational. Outstanding examples of groups of people who came together, or already existed, and were engaged continually in VTP activities include Women Strike for Peace, SANE, Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, Fifth Avenue Anti-Vietnam Peace Parade Committee, and such groups which came together periodically as the North Shore Women for Peace (1968), Concerned Voters of Beverly Hills (1967), Los Angeles Peace Action Council (1967). The list of associational groups involved, as with the lists for the various other interest articulating structures, could be lengthened

considerably.[24] Overall, literally hundreds of such groups came into being and were part of the peace movement.

Communication channels.--Of the four possible types of communication channels, one type was not especially viable as a means of access; this was elite representation. During most of the six-year period, only remote areas of the policy-making level could be perceived as having represented interests of the peace movement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and various Congressmen (including Wayne Morse, George McGovern, Robert Kennedy, Gaylord Nelson, J. William Fulbright) reflected some of the protesters' concerns; until the last part of the period, however, the number of these elite representatives was comparatively small. With this, taking the perspective of Lester Milbrath in his work on interest groups, it could be said that as Senate Foreign Relations and the various Congressmen remained a minority, they assumed a character "similar to nongovernmental interest groups that try to influence governmental decisions."[25] This perspective was not used here, for the most part. Yet, the weakness of this particular channel is indicated. Regarding the question of elite representation in the

Johnson Administration, James C. Thomson, Jr., Far East specialist at Harvard and formerly with the Department of State and the White House staff (1961-1966), has gone to some length to argue and to illustrate that "through a variety of procedures, both institutional and personal, doubt, dissent and expertise [on United States policy in Vietnam] were effectively neutralized in the making of policy," and the military nature of the policy was allowed to continue at the decision-making level.[26] The exact situation on this matter within the present Administration is uncertain.

The degree to which personal connection as a channel was utilized is not completely apparent. Individuals opposing the war, who were well known to decision-makers, probably made use of this channel on a larger scale than reported. Former participants in the policy making process (e.g., Hilsman, Kennan), members of the mass media (e.g., Lippman), members of other areas of the government (e.g., Fulbright), established members of the business community, and prominent citizens (e.g., King)--all who were in some way members of the opposition may be assumed to have utilized the personal channel to articulate their interests. There are several recorded instances of

this channel being used. Robert Kennedy's widely publicized contacts with President Johnson in late 1967 and early 1968, in which he reportedly offered not to seek the Presidency if Johnson would take some specific steps towards a peaceful settlement, is one example. During the Moratorium of October, 1967, the then Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson and Presidential advisor Henry Kissenger met with representatives of several VTP groups. Regarding the Johnson years, Thomson writes that opponents of the policy such as A. J. Muste and Norman Thomas (as well as other representatives from various peace groups) met often with members of the White House staff and the State Department. He argues that there was a preoccupation with Vietnam public relations; public relations was handled by those who had some doubt about the worth of the policy; and these public relations men were ordered to keep the critics "off the backs of the policy-makers" who were usually the nondoubters.[27]

One might distinguish a <u>weak</u> form of personal connection: direct personal contact with a policy-maker. Telegrams and letters from groups and individuals would be one example under this. The teach-ins of March-May, 1965, in which government officials met with opponents of

the war from the academic community on university campuses, would be another example; initially, the teach-in took the form of an "extended debate" although it was shortly to become a further vehicle for genuine antiwar protest.[28] Novelist Mitchell Goodman, at the National Books Award Ceremony in March, 1967, shouting to Vice President Humphrey (the main speaker) as fifty writers walked out, "Mr. Vice President, we are burning children in Vietnam and you and we are all responsible," and Eartha Kitt's attack on the war at a White House tea (January, 1968) might be considered as further instances of this type of connection. If one employs a slightly different perspective on the entire political system and assumes that the power on which policy rests is with the people, then "Vietnam Summer" (directed in part by Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1967), in which thousands of volunteers in cities throughout the nation rang doorbells and distributed literature in an effort to increase the general public's opposition to the war, then the actions taken by these volunteers vis-á-vis the other citizens would represent a utilization of this channel of "weak" personal connection. For the most part, however, this channel in both the weak and strong forms was not as used as much as the

remaining two types.

Physical demonstrations and (to a much smaller degree) violence was a major channel through which interests were articulated. Much is included under the term demonstrations, including marches, rallies, petitions, acts of civil disobedience, and perhaps even suicide. Several cases of people taking their lives in protest were reported over the six years.

A major source for rallies and marches initially was the academic community. The number of these rallies gradually increased on campuses in the early months of 1965 (Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, and Columbia, as examples). In April 1965, 15,000 students marched in front of the White House in opposition to the war. By mid-1965, rallies and marches had extended into the streets, with participants from other areas involved. Notable examples include the "End the War in Vietnam" rally in San Francisco (May, 1965), protest marches of 50,000 peoples in various cities (April, 1966), Spring Mobilization Marches in New York (125,000) and San Francisco (50,000) (April, 1967), the Century Plaza demonstration (issues in addition to the war were involved here) (June, 1967), the Pentagon March of 55,000 (October, 1967), Chicago (10,000!) (August, 1968),

the October Moratorium (250,000--New York, 50,000--Washington, 100,000--Boston) (October, 1969), the November Moratorium (250,000--Washington, 200,000--San Francisco, including 40,000 in the "March Against Death" in Washington) (November, 1969), and the Kent State aftermath (60,000, Washington) (May, 1970).

In conjunction with marches and rallies, demonstrations were manifested in other forms. Acts of civil disobedience, performed for the most part as political acts of opposition, were taken beginning in early 1965 and continuing through 1970. Sit-ins at induction centers and draft boards took place occasionally. By 1967, some participants in demonstrations of this type, notably Berkeley's Stop the Draft Week of October, 1967, had accepted as extremely likely the possibility of violent confrontations. The first draft-card burning on record took place in New York in October, 1965, and this was followed by others until it was decided that simply turning in draft cards would be a more viable means for protest. Along with other activities, several hundred draft cards were turned in, in addition to many illegal statements of complicity. Acts of civil disobedience were taken within the military as with Dr. Howard Levy's refusal in 1967 to train medics

for duty in Vietnam or as with a sizable number of soldiers who went AWOL in protest and took sanctuary in churches. By late 1967 and early 1968, a few demonstrations took on shades of the comic and the absurd. A contingent of demonstrators at the Pentagon in October, 1967 carried placards with slogans such as "Withdraw Now--Like LBJ's Father Should Have"; by 1970 this manner of protest had evolved into choruses of "F--- Nixon," both in Knoxville and Washington.[29] Plans for the Chicago Convention by the Youth International Party ("Yippies"), announced early in 1968, approached the point of the absurd: intentions were expressed to pollute the Chicago water supply with LSD, to find LBJ and take off his pants, and to nominate a pig for President and then eat it.[30] In one unique demonstration of opposition, in July, 1967 in Los Angeles, thirty artists threw their art work into a fire to show that "the life of a single human being is worth more than a man's art."[31] For the most part, engaging in violence was infrequent: a small but widely publicized account at the Pentagon in 1967, as well as at the Counter-Inaugural demonstration (January, 1969), and at the November, 1969 Moratorium in Washington. In the aftermath of Cambodia, Kent State, and Jackson State, only 5 per cent

of the 30 per cent of all universities and colleges engaged in strike activity experienced violence.[32] The Scranton Commission reports that the overall trend during the last decade was towards more acts of violence and terror, as in the bombing and/or disruption of draft boards and of university offices engaged in defense research.[33]

Formal and institutional channels, the fourth type, were also utilized greatly. The mass media were used in a variety of ways. In some instances demonstrations and the mass media were in effect fused so as to form one channel; at the Pentagon and later at Chicago, this was evident--at Chicago a few demonstrations were stepped-up for the benefit of television cameras. In terms of the press, editors opposed to United States policy used their newspapers as vehicles to express opposition; examples include from early in the period, The Milwaukee Journal, Houston Chronicle, Washington Star, and progressing along to the Wall Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and many others. This was the case also with magazine editors, as with Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review and the editors of the New York Review of Books. New magazines and newspapers were formed as vehicles through which to express opposition; examples

include Ramparts, Viet-Report, The Partisan, Free Student, and Insurgent. The writing of books was also a means for expressing opposition: Mary McCarthy's Vietnam, Bertrand Russell's War Crimes in Vietnam, Theodore Draper's Abuse of Power. Art forms also constituted a medium: literature (e.g., Norman Mailer's Why Are We in Vietnam?); the theatre (e.g., Barbara Garson's "MacBird," Feiffer's "White House Murder Case," Daniel Berrigan's "Trial of the Catonsville Nine"); music (e.g., Baez, Dylan, Ochs); painting (e.g., John Groth, following in the tradition of Goya); photography (e.g., David Douglas Duncan); film (e.g., "Day of the Locust"); art was, of course, a more indirect part of the channel to utilize.

Governmental structures were a little used institutional channel during most of the period; yet this was used. Opponents to the war policy did testify before Congressional committees, notably Fulbright's Vietnam hearings. Movement into political parties and elections was a primary means for articulating demands. In 1966, peace candidates ran for office and some were elected. The National Conference for New Politics, created in 1966, was active in training volunteers and raising funds for peace candidates. Periodically, a local group (such as

the Concerned Voters of Beverly Hills) was successful in getting a referendum on the war placed on ballot for local elections. In late 1967, various organizations in or related to the Democratic Party (some newly formed such as the Dissenting Democrats), began a "dump-LBJ" drive. In November, 1967, the McCarthy campaign got underway followed by the Kennedy/McGovern campaign in March, 1968. Most war opponents supported one of these two campaigns. Some opponents to United States war policy eventually formed third parties, notably the Peace and Freedom party (and variations of it in several states). And efforts to elect peace candidates were made again in 1970. Interestingly, another government structure utilized was the courts. Attempts were made by several people opposing the war, a widely publicized one by Benjamin Spock and William Sloane Coffin and three others, to have the issue of the legality of the war brought before and considered with the American legal system. These efforts failed, however. Also, late in the period, April, 1970, a State government moved into the ranks of the peace movement when the Massachusetts legislature passed and the Governor signed into law a bill which forbade the requiring of an inhabitant of the Commonwealth who had been inducted into or was

serving in the armed forces of the United States "to serve outside the territorial limits of the United States in the conduct of armed hostilities unless such hostilities were initially authorized or subsequently ratified by a Congressional declaration of war."[34]

With regard to styles of interest articulation listed earlier, each type was exhibited at some point during the period. The styles of most acts, referred to thus far, can be inferred from the above discussion. The style used least was the instrumental demand; one of the few instances of its being used (and a notable one) was the Kennedy-Johnson meeting referred to above. All of the other types were common during the course of the movement, with (probably) diffuse demands predominating. Latent demands, as discussed above, were present yet excluded in this present study.

As indicated by this brief survey, the magnitude of antiwar protest both in terms of variety and quantity was considerable. If what is commonly called the peace movement is to be analyzed as a part of the opinion-policy relationship (Rosenau's model), then it seems that the phenomenon as described largely by the above (with as much magnitude as possible) ought to be seen as constituting

the peace movement, and used. To repeat an earlier point: If, for instance, the movement is only seen in terms of massive demonstrations, a considerable portion of the movement is subsequently lost. In this present work, data for VTP are composed of activities and actions such as those described above--actions that can be accommodated by Almond and Powell's framework on interest articulation are those making up this collection of VTP data.

Footnotes to Chapter III

[1]William W. Scranton (Chairman), The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (New York: Avon Books, 1971), pp. 467-518.

[2]Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence) (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969).

[3]Ibid., p. 68.

[4]Newsweek, July 10, 1967.

[5]Raymond Tanter, "International War and Domestic Turmoil: Some Contemporary Evidence," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 550-570.

[6]Skolnick, op. cit., p. 27.

[7]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), pp. 73-90.

[8]Ibid., p. 75.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., pp. 74-79.

[11]Ibid., pp. 80-86.

[12]Ibid., pp. 86-88.

[13]Skolnick, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

[14]Scranton, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[15]Ibid., p. 85.

[16]Estimates of the number of people who emigrated ranged from a few thousand to several tens of thousands. In April, 1969, J. William Fulbright estimated that 50,000 had emigrated, partially in reaction to the war. New York Times, April 28, 1969.

[17]Skolnick, op. cit., p. 59.

[18]Scranton, op. cit., p. 29.

[19]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 997. Also, Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 745.

[20]Quoted in George Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: Delta Press, 1967).

[21]Daniel Walker (Director of the Chicago Study Team), Rights in Conflict. The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Parks and Streets of Chicago during the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968. A Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, December, 1968), p. 19.

[22]Scranton, op. cit., p. 23.

[23]"The Emergence of SDS," Time, May 24, 1968.

[24]The sources for groups listed in this section were Newsweek, surveyed from November, 1963 to December, 1970, and the Walker Report.

[25]Lester Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 246.

[26]James C. Thomson, Jr., "How Could Vietnam Happen?" Atlantic, April, 1968.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Scranton, op. cit., p. 30.

[29]New York Times, May 29, 1970.

[30]Newsweek, March 11, 1968.

[31]Newsweek, July 6, 1967.

[32]Scranton, op. cit., p. 45.

[33]Ibid., p. 47.

[34]Newsweek, April 13, 1970.

CHAPTER IV

THE HYPOTHESES AND THE METHODOLOGY

Much of the writing that has recently been done, related to the opinion-policy relationship as it refers to United States policy in Vietnam, has been essentially concerned with public opinion on the war and administration activity in relation to the policy. The analysis of public opinion in recent writing has been of an especially high quality and will be considered in part, below. Some of this writing has touched upon the antiwar protest, yet not in great depth. Some writing has focused primarily on war protest, and with this there has been general public discussion concerned with war protest. This overall discussion has suggested some interesting ideas, while at the same time it has brought to light some conflicting and ambiguous views.

Several hypotheses, derived largely from this recent discussion, will be introduced in this chapter, and in the following chapter they will be examined. There will

be a brief section initially on the development of VTP apart from all other factors. Of main interest are the relationships of VTP to opinion on the war, administration activity, and the policy itself; consideration of these will make up the heart of the section. Additionally, several secondary factors will be examined, as these main relationships are considered.

The following twelve major hypotheses are to be tested.

1. From the beginning of 1965 to the end of 1970, antiwar protest continuously increased on an annual basis.

2. From the beginning of 1965 to the end of 1970, antiwar protest of a violent, illegal, and/or civil disobedient nature increased on an annual basis.

3. For the six years, 1965-1970, the number of intense points of antiwar protest exhibited a seasonal fluctuation with the academic year.

4. For each of the six years and for the overall period, levels of VTP activity did not relate significantly to levels in draft calls.

5. For each of the six years and for the overall period, current levels of VTP activity did not relate significantly to levels of Americans killed in action.

6. As levels of VTP activity are lagged with levels for DRAFT and KIL, eight time lags ranging from one to eight weeks, some significant relationships emerge with VTP-KIL and VTP-DRAFT, for the entire period.

7. For each of the six years and for the overall period, levels of VTP activity did relate significantly to levels of Administration activity on the war.

8. For the overall period, as ADM is lagged with VTP (following VTP), levels of ADM relate significantly with levels of VTP.

9. For the overall period, as VTP is lagged with ADM (following ADM), levels of VTP relate significantly with levels of ADM.

10. For each of the six years and for the overall period, high levels of VTP activity relate significantly to high levels of public opinion favorable to the conduct of the war policy.

11. For the overall period, as public opinion is lagged with VTP activity for short intervals of up to three weeks (i.e., opinion following VTP), high levels of VTP activity relate significantly to high levels of public opinion favorable to the conduct of the war policy.

12. For the overall period, as public opinion is lagged with VTP activity for intervals greater than three weeks (i.e., opinion following VTP), high levels of VTP activity relate significantly to low levels of public opinion favorable to the conduct of the war.

For Hypotheses 4 through 12 two basic techniques of bivariate correlation analysis are used: the Pearson Correlation and Donald Veldman's LAGCOR. Each correlation may be used to describe the strength of association between an independent variable and a dependent variable or the strength of association between sets of independent or

dependent variables. A single summary statistic, the correlation coefficient, indicates the strength of the association. This coefficient may range in value from +1.0, indicating a "perfect" positive relationship, to -1.0, indicating a "perfect" negative relationship. A coefficient of 0 indicates the existence of no relationship between variables. Each technique may be applied to variables whose relationship is not nonlinear. LAGCOR differs from PEARSON CORR only in that the measurements of association are taken over the same variables at different periods of time.[1]

Footnotes to Chapter IV

[1] Norman Nie, Dale H. Bent, C. Hadlar Hull, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 143-146. Also, World Event Interaction Survey, Data Processing Programs: LAGCOR, prepared by Herbert J. Calhoun (Los Angeles, California, 1970, mimeographed).

CHAPTER V

THE HYPOTHESES DESCRIBED AND TESTED

The first hypotheses are rather elementary and concern the development of VTP in itself and apart from all other factors.

The Peace Movement

The Skolnick Report on The Politics of Protest, utilizing the unpublished study of Irving L. Horowitz on mass antiwar protest (involving a thousand or more participants per demonstration) suggests that antiwar protest from the spring of 1965 to the spring of 1968 continually increased in quantity.[1] This is similar to and accords with the observation on all student protest of the Scranton Commission that:

> To the extent that audience reaction was the proximate goal of student protest, the activists were at any given moment under a strong incentive to express themselves a little louder and a bit more forcefully than the last time--otherwise there was a possibility that people would become accustomed to acts of protest and begin to ignore them.[2]

The thrust of these two observations then suggests the creation of a slightly more general hypothesis, viz.,

> Hypothesis 1. From the beginning of 1965 to the end of 1970, antiwar protest continuously increased on an annual basis.

If the arithmetic mean amount of protest per week for each of the years from 1965 to 1970 are computed, the results are as follows:[3]

1965 = 14.80 acts per week
1966 = 16.89 acts per week/change of +04.09
1967 = 28.54 acts per week/change of +11.65
1968 = 29.52 acts per week/change of +00.98
1969 = 31.17 acts per week/change of +01.65
1970 = 38.19 acts per week/change of +07.02

Support for this hypothesis, considered on a yearly basis, is thus indicated. The amount of protest per year between 1965 through 1970 did increase, with rather significant increases in the years 1967 and 1970, though with very small increases in 1968 and in 1969.

With its statement quoted immediately above, the Scranton Commission added the statement,

> Thus, the simple passing of time spurred the movement to go farther and farther afield of the tactics and perspectives of instrumentalist, reforming politics, and closer and closer to a thorough-going radical strategy.[4]

Again, this statement refers to <u>all student</u> protest (thus including protest on all issues, a large part of which was antiwar, and excluding those engaged in antiwar protest who were not students). Yet, this statement suggests a view

commonly held, which may be put in the form of a second descriptive hypothesis on the development of VTP.

> Hypothesis 2. From the beginning of 1965 to the end of 1970 antiwar protest of a violent, illegal, and/or civil disobedient nature increased on an annual basis.

If the arithmetic mean amount of this kind of protest per week for each of the six years, 1965-1970, are computed, the results are as follows:

1965 = 01.63
1966 = 01.45/change of -0.18
1967 = 04.15/change of +2.70
1968 = 10.54/change of +6.39
1969 = 06.52/change of -4.02
1970 = 07.21/change of +0.69

Thus, considering the kind of protest implied by the Scranton Commission in their statement, the data for which were collected here in a rather elementary way (see criteria Number 20 for VTP, p. 25), support for this descriptive view of the war protest, Hypothesis 2, is not indicated. Decreases in levels of protest of this nature occurred in 1966 (slight) and in 1969 (a comparatively large decrease) following the peak year for the period, 1968. While all antiwar protest continuously increased or at least stayed at about the same level during the six years (Hypothesis 1), this was not paralleled by the development of protest of a violent or illegal nature.

Corresponding to this, while protest acts of this nature were found to have some overall association with all antiwar protest (with PEARSON CORR), the association was not especially strong (r = +0.55). The Report from the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility found in their study of all protest (including antiwar protest) that "group violence has no necessary relationship to group protest";[5] and this finding lends some support to the present finding on Hypothesis 2. From a descriptive point of view, it cannot be maintained that violent and illegal antiwar protest continuously increased on a yearly basis over the six years.

A third hypothesis of a descriptive nature concerning the development of VTP derives from Tanter's work. Tanter writes, and again he is concerned with mass demonstrations as protest, that "the frequency of antiwar protests exhibits a seasonal fluctuation with the academic year,"[6] for the period, January, 1965 through the spring of 1968. The frequency of war protest is said to be highest during the academic year. Tanter's own data on this does offer support to the idea, although there is some variety in the frequency of the activity of nearly all

the months. Overall, a total of fourteen points of very intense protest in the period are designated; of these, ten appear in the winter and spring seasons (four and six, respectively) with two in each of the other two seasons. With a broader collection of data on VTP the idea of Tanter is worth re-examination. Stated in hypothetical form, it appears as follows:

> Hypothesis 3. For the six years, 1965-1970, the number of intense points of antiwar protest exhibited a seasonal fluctuation with the academic year.

In testing this hypothesis, VTP activity per week was examined on a visual basis (graphically) and a total of twenty-six of the seventy-two months were found to contain comparative peaks of VTP activity (comparative, designated arbitrarily, in terms of the changing levels of protest activity during a particular year). Spring months had nine such points, summer and fall each had six, and winter had five. The seasonal fluctuation is not especially great; the largest change occurs between winter and spring. A comparison of the mean number of peaks of the seasons making up the academic year to that of summer reveals a difference not especially great: 6.67 to 6.00 points of intense protest for fall-winter-spring and summer, respec-

tively. With Tanter, this ratio is 4.00 to 2.00. There is thus very little support for this last of the descriptive hypotheses. The number of points of intense VTP protest exhibited very little seasonal change; during the seasons of the academic year, the number of points of intense protest increased slightly--although there is some evidence for the magnitude of VTP remaining fairly constant on a seasonal basis.

In terms, then, of some of the minor statements that have been made about the development of the protest movement, it has been seen that (1) the amount of VTP activity on a weekly basis did continuously increase annually during the six years; (2) this increase was not paralleled by violent and illegal protest--such protest did not reach an especially high mean weekly level for the period in the following year; and (3) the number of points of intense VTP activity exhibited little seasonal change in the period which could be said to be dependent on the academic year.

The Policy and the Peace Movement

Not a great deal has been written about the relationship between antiwar protest and developments in the

war policy--in terms of Rosenau's model--on whether there is evidence of VTP utilizing a channel of perception connected to the developments in the war, and on whether a descriptive relationship can be established between the levels of activities of the two sections of the model.

The Skolnick Report is agonizingly vague on this matter. The Report states,

> There is . . . a correlation between the degree of our military involvement and the size of protest. . . . But the Korean [War] reminds us that the degree of American involvement and sacrifice cannot account for the level of protest.[7]

And then,

> The [antiwar] movement is best understood as a result of events, not as a generator of future actions. These events . . . led an amorphous set of organizations to oppose the war.[8]

At the risk of being tautological, it is pointed out that

> . . . the chief sustaining element in the Vietnam protest movement has been the war in Vietnam. . . . . . there is a widespread feeling among those who participate in active criticism of the war that the movement would collapse without the presence of a worsening military situation and a domestic social crisis. . . .[9]

Again,

> . . . demonstrations are typically an <u>outcome</u> of events uncontrolled by the movement, rather than a generator of future actions. . . .[10] [Italics mine].

And, with the injection of a new phrase,

> . . . the movement's options have been continually defined by unanticipated events, and this will surely remain the case. . . . As in the past, the movement can be counted on to respond more according to its temporary mood than according to ideology or strategic plan.[11] [Italics mine]

The "events" mentioned in the Report refer essentially to an entire complex of matters, including developments in the war, in the domestic situation of South Vietnam, in the domestic scene of the United States, and so on. Yet occasionally, as indicated above, some emphasis is given to developments in the American conduct of the war. However, an attempt to put this factor of the war into clear perspective as it relates to the development of antiwar protest is not made. Confusion increases when the element of VTP's "mood" (as a basis for determining response) is injected in the discussion.

Interestingly, and in terms of student protest, the Scranton Commission offers the following which is of some relevance, it seems, to this element of mood. The Commission points out that regardless of whether protest was violent or nonviolent,

> Demonstrations were generally . . . actions designed primarily to bear witness to the participants' views and depth of concern . . . [After

> 1967, when violence increased] no student protester throwing a rock through a laboratory window believes that it will stop the Indochina war, weapons research, or the advance of the feared technology--yet he throws it in a mood of defiant exultation--almost exaltation. He has taken a moral stance.[12]

Additionally, in this area of mood and from a slightly different perspective, it has been suggested that although some protest may have been enthusiastic, it essentially involved frustration and despair: acts of protest were sometimes outrageous as protest itself was perceived by a particular actor as fruitless, to begin with. The Scranton Commission ignores almost entirely specific developments in policies as they relate to student protest. An implication of this along with the statement just quoted on mood is, possibly, that specific developments in policy were largely irrelevant to protest.

Although Raymond Tanter's primary concern is with the general relationship between international war and domestic turmoil, within this concern he has discovered some interesting relationships between antiwar protest and the development of the United States war policy in Vietnam. His work constitutes a third contribution to the discussion of this question. His findings, pertinent here, include the following:

1. Between January 1965 and November 1965, the initial period of U.S. escalation of the war, the changes in the number of protests were a response to change in U.S. force levels in Vietnam.

2. The rate of change in number of protest participants during the initial Vietnam escalation period is negatively related to the slope of Vietnam escalation. That is, the higher the rate of change in Vietnam escalation, the lower the rate of change in protest participation.

3. The mean number of protest participants increases from about 14,400 per month during the escalation phase to approximately 38,700 per month during the leveling-off phase, February 1967-July 1968. Though fewer demonstrations were held, more people attended them. Thus, the number of people participating in antiwar protests may be a response to the level of commitment, the duration of U.S. involvement, or both.

4. The relative decline of the rate of increase in turmoil (i.e., antiwar protest) parallels the slow-down in the Vietnam buildup.[13]

In terms of what has been said about antiwar protest in this paper, it may be seen that Tanter is concerned with two measures of only one limited, yet significant, area of the antiwar movement. This area is mass demonstrations, and the two measures of this area are the number of these demonstrations over time and the number of participants in the demonstrations. And in examining these measures in relation to change in United States military force levels in Vietnam, his findings are interesting and will be considered further below. The immediate thrust of the findings though is that there is a significant

relationship between protest and developments in the war policy.

Emerging from this overall discussion on the protest-policy relationship are some potentially inconsistent tendencies: specific developments in the war policy were related to developments in protest and/or they were not. In this present study, two factors are used to indicate developments in the war policy: the number of Americans killed in action in Vietnam and draft calls--and both of these are considered on a weekly basis. (In his work Tanter mentions, incidentally, that United States casualties might have been as easily used as the variable of the number of forces sent to Vietnam.)[14] For this present examination, then, and in terms of the general questions as to whether a significant relationship exists between developments in the war and developments in the protest, the questions become whether changes in levels of the protest relate significantly to changes in levels of Americans killed in action or to changes in the draft call levels. Basic impressions acquired as a result of having observed the developments in both the war and the antiwar movement and having reviewed the discussion on the question, as described above, lead to the following views.

No relationship exists between developments in the war and developments in protest occurring at the same time; there may be one exception to this, May, 1970, with the Cambodian invasion, when Americans killed (KIL) and protest increased together, simultaneously. If protest is examined one to eight weeks following the factors KIL or DRAFT, some significant relationships probably emerge between levels of KIL or DRAFT and later protest (one to eight weeks subsequent to the KIL or DRAFT levels). The general impression of protest as a response to the war thus emerges. From these impressions then, the following hypotheses are derived.

> Hypothesis 4. For each of the six years and for the overall period, levels of VTP activity did <u>not</u> relate significantly to levels in DRAFT calls.
>
> Hypothesis 5. For each of the six years and for the overall period, current levels of VTP activity did <u>not</u> relate significantly to current levels of KIL (Americans killed in action).
>
> Hypothesis 6. As levels of VTP activity are lagged with levels for DRAFT and KIL, eight time lags ranging from one to eight weeks, some significant relationships emerge with VTP-KIL and VTP-DRAFT, for the entire period.

Testing the hypotheses with the Pearson r, the results are as follows: For Hypothesis 4, VTP-DRAFT, no significant association was found to exist for the overall

period (r = -0.10). In examining the hypothesis on a yearly basis, in only two years was there found to be some association: VTP-DRAFT were found to be positively associated in 1965 (r = +0.61) and negatively associated in 1969 (r = -0.54). In no other year is there a positive association. The discovery of a slight negative association in 1969 is a bit surprising (yet it may be noted that this was the year that President Nixon, according to the common view, cancelled or greatly reduced draft calls for the last three months of the year in anticipation of the October and November Moratoriums; thus, from October to December, VTP activity was quite high and DRAFT was low). With the exception of the year, 1965, then, the results of the testing for the remaining years seem to indicate that from a descriptive point of view, VTP developed independently of simultaneous developments in the war as indicated by the factor DRAFT.

Testing Hypothesis 5, VTP-KIL, the following results are obtained. For the entire period, no relation between the two factors is found (r = +0.15). Testing the hypothesis on a yearly basis, in only one year does a significant association emerge: For 1970, r = +0.72, when before, during, and after the Cambodian invasion,

there appears for a few weeks from late April through June the high levels of both protest and Americans killed in action--the highest levels for the entire year. The relationship for the year 1965 ought to be excluded, as figures on American casualties are available only for the last half of the year. In only one of five years, then, is there a significant association for VTP-KIL. Thus, at least in the four years, 1966-1969, the results of the testing indicate in descriptive terms that VTP developed independently of simultaneous developments in the war, as indicated by the factor of KIL (Americans killed in action).

The results of the testing of Hypothesis 6, regardless of the length of the lag (which varies from one to eight weeks), indicates that there is not one strong association between the level of VTP and the corresponding levels of either of the two factors used to indicate developments in the war policy. The "strongest" association which appears is with VTP lagged one week, after KIL ($r = +0.13$). There is thus no support for the general hypothesis that over the six-year period the level of VTP activity after a designated period of time ranging from one to eight weeks relates to the level of developments in the war policy. (Additionally, in terms of a time lead,

antiwar protest one to eight weeks prior to developments in the war exhibited no significant relationship to the later developments in the war as reflected in the levels for KIL and DRAFT.)

As a result of the testing of these hypotheses and in the light of the recent and related discussion, the following ideas begin to emerge regarding the development of antiwar protest. Again, to make the tautological point of the Skolnick Report, "the chief sustaining element of the Vietnam protest movement has been the war in Vietnam." Yet in only two years, 1965 and 1970, was a notable relationship found to exist between levels of protest and levels in specific developments of the war policy; and only once was the relationship especially strong--that of 1970 with VTP-KIL. For the most part levels of protest activity did not relate to levels of Americans killed in action or levels of draft calls; indeed, several periods exist in the six years where there are especially high levels in the war policy factors with corresponding low levels of VTP activity.

The idea of VTP acting according to its mood (a notion introduced by the Skolnick Report and developed by the Scranton Commission, as discussed above) and thereby

providing access to the taking of "actions designed primarily to bear witness to the participants' views and depth of concern" (from Scranton, quoted above), regardless of whatever specific events are happening in the war at the time--this idea is not excluded by the results of the hypotheses. And, indeed, by default, some support seems to be indicated for it. If mass demonstrations such as the Pentagon March of 1967 or the Fall Moratoriums of 1969 are considered, and cognizance is taken of all of the months of planning required prior to a major VTP activity of this type, then this lack of association between protest and policy becomes more intelligible. Also, this same phenomenon of long-planned protest may apply to an individual or small group level; the idea of engaging in protest may occur at one point to an individual or small group, followed by some manner of planning, and eventually execution, regardless of specific happenings in the war at the time of execution. And within this phenomenon, regardless of the level (individual, mass, or small group), mood may be seen to be fundamentally involved.

Yet, finally, returning to the strong association of 1965 and 1970, support is given to some of Tanter's principle ideas on the relationship between amount of

protest and rate of escalation. If January-November, 1965 and May-June, 1970 are seen as the two major periods of United States escalation in the war, support is given to the descriptive view that high levels of rates of escalation are accompanied by high levels of protest (essentially, Tanter's first point, listed above). Although rate of escalation in itself, and factors capable of indicating measurement for it, are not within the scope of this study, it is a matter closely associated to the more general factor of war policy used here; and discoveries of associations between protest and policy here are of some relevance to Tanter's earlier and similar findings. Along with the 1965 and 1970 associations, it ought to be noted that what Tanter designates as the period of the leveling off of escalation, February, 1967-July, 1968 (which could easily be extended at least through 1969, a period beyond the range of Tanter's work), this leveling off period corresponds to the leveling off of VTP activity; mean weekly VTP protest from 1967 through 1969 increased from 28.5 to 31.2, as noted above. Minimally, then, and in terms of this study, a significant relationship between level of protest and rate of escalation is thus suggested--and worthy of further, later investigation.

What seems to emerge from this examination of the protest-policy relationship are four elements which are rather complexly related: (1) periods of high rates of United States escalation within the war, (2) comparatively high levels of VTP activity existing in relation to high rates of United States escalation, (3) the existence of the war itself, and (4) VTP activity levels as a function of VTP's "mood" which together exist in a relationship with the general phenomenon of the Vietnam war (and no particular aspect of it). And it need not be stressed that VTP is conceived of as an extremely heterogeneous "body" of essentially unrelated people and groups; thus, when the word "mood" is applied to this body, it is done in a very general way.

The question of high levels of protest relating to policy developments towards de-militarization and de-escalation, an area distinct from the one just considered will be discussed towards the end of this paper.

The Relationship of VTP and Secondary Factors

In examining the relationship of antiwar protest activity to developments in the secondary factors of foreign-based antiwar protest, domestic support of the

policy, Congressional activity on the policy, and news coverage on the policy, some interesting things are found.

From a descriptive point of view, one could formulate a number of minor hypotheses on these several relationships. From an impressionistic standpoint, it seems likely to expect some strong relationships between VTP and foreign antiwar activity (FOR) and VTP and domestic levels of support (SUP) of the policy. In terms of the other possible relationships involving VTP and the remaining secondary factors, it is not certain whether one should expect any strong relationship to exist.

The results of testing all possible relationships here with Pearson r on all years and individual years and LAGCOR on all years together, are the following. For VTP-FOR no significant relationship was found; a slight relationship was found in 1967 ($r = +0.47$) with no lag or lead. A significant association was found between VTP and domestic acts of support for four of six years with no lag or lead: 1965, $r = +0.67$; 1967, $r = +0.63$; 1969, $r = +0.74$; and 1970, $r = +0.72$. Over all six years, $r = +0.53$. When SUP leads VTP by one week, a slight relationship ($r = +0.48$); when VTP leads SUP by one week, even less of a relationship exists ($r = +0.36$); and this is

probably not enough to suggest the hypothesis that VTP was in part a response to SUP. The close association of the two factors for the majority of the period, four out of six years, can probably be largely understood in terms of counter-demonstrations of each against the other with a majority of counter-demonstrations being undertaken by SUP--this according to impressions derived from surveying the period; no data exist to support the notion, however.

With regard to the other hypotheses, the following was found. No significant association existed in any year or overall between VTP and Congressional activity on the war, with either LAGCOR or Pearson r. And in terms of VTP's relationship to news coverage on the war, in only one year was a significant relationship found: 1970, the year of Cambodia, when from April through June reporting on events related to the war and VTP activity increased substantially, simultaneously (along with other factors including administration activity and the number of Americans killed in action). For VTP-NYT 1970, $r = +0.90$; for VTP-LAT 1970, $r = +0.69$. In 1969, slight associations existed, which may be understood largely in terms of the extensive reporting on the two main Fall Moratoriums; for 1969 NYT-VTP, $r = +0.56$ and for VTP-LAT, $r = +0.42$. And

in 1966 a slight association between VTP and NYT ($r = +0.45$). With LAGCOR no significant association was found.

That which emerges then from an examination of VTP's relationships with the secondary factors are the two especially notable discoveries (VTP-news coverage, 1970; and VTP-SUP for four of six years) which are both fairly easily understood. It seems equally significant that with the exception of one year where there was a slight association, VTP and foreign protest were not significantly associated in any year; an impression, regarding especially the first three years, that a significant association did exist (i.e., major domestic and international protest did occur simultaneously), is thus destroyed. Also, of note, the total lack of association between Congressional activity on matters related to the war (the mean weekly level for which declined from the previous years in both 1967 and 1968) and antiwar protest seems to indicate a considerable distance between the developing concerns with the war of each of these "bodies."

The Johnson and Nixon Administrations and the Peace Movement

Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations exhib-

ited a large measure of concern with the antiwar movement, as it developed; and both, obviously, were engaged to some degree in making statements (of explanation, defense, and so on) about the war policy. The primary objectives in looking at both administration activity on the war and antiwar protest is to see whether some relationship existed between the two which could be understood either as an administration response to VTP (response by means of making a large number of statements on the policy) or, perhaps, a VTP response (in terms of a rise in the amount of protest) to increased in administration activity.

In order to gain a partial understanding of the VTP-ADM relationship, some attention may be given to the concern exhibited by both administrations with the antiwar movement. And it should be noted initially that administration statements reflecting this concern are excluded from the variable ADM activity on the war policy (as this latter activity was confined exclusively to the war). If some insight can be gained as a result of description in this area, then this may facilitate the quantitative analysis and the development of subsequent conclusions.

In surveying the six-year period, as the other data were collected from the New York Times Index, specific

instances of administration response to the antiwar movement itself were also collected (in a somewhat cursory manner) and recorded. Nearly seventy such instances were found and recorded. Within these, ten basic types of response by the administration seemed to be exhibited; and these were as follows.

1. Traitors.--The administrations' charge of treason, leveled at the antiwar movement, was manifested in various forms during the period. The charge that the peace movement was backed by and infiltrated with communists was made several times early in the period (J. Edgar Hoover, June 2, 1965; Attorney General Katzenbach, October 18, 1965--all dates referring to the New York Times); notably, the charge has recently been picked up by Attorney General Mitchell (April 24, 1971). In line with this charge, incidentally, a constitutional amendment was proposed in the House of Representatives early in 1966 to ban war protests by "beatnik types and pseudo-intellectuals" with a provision for fines and imprisonment for those aiding the enemy (February 11, 1966). Former President Eisenhower, a friend of the administration, equated dissent with "near treason" (April 6, 1968). And with the new

administration, VTP was charged as being partly composed of "an effete corps of impudent snobs . . . hardcore dissidents and professional anarchists" (Agnew, October 20, 1969); and shortly thereafter these became "bums" (Nixon, May 2, 1970).

2. Punishment.--From early in 1966 and into 1967 various members of VTP were "punished" with draft reclassification for their expression of dissent. During this period, the systemic measure of cancelling all II-S draft deferments for graduate and professional students was taken as well. In 1969 federal aid funds, for higher education, to students opposing the war was cut sizably.

3. Jeopardizing United States policy.--On several occasions it was charged that VTP would prolong the war, aid the enemy, or prescribe surrender--in effect jeopardize the purpose of the policy (early with United States Ambassador Taylor, October 16, 1965; and late, Agnew, June 21, 1970).

4. VTP as misinformed.--This was a charge used early in the period (as with Rusk, October 15, 1965); also, incidentally, this charge has been recently picked up by

Agnew (April 26, 1971).

5. VTP as neo-isolationist.--Vice President Humphrey charged some war critics as being "neo-isolationist" in 1966 (August 24), and the charge was reiterated on occasion throughout the period.

6. General attack.--Several instances were found in which officials of both administrations made a general attack on VTP elements with no specific charge present.

7. VTP as inconsequential.--This charge was used with considerable frequency; it was emphasized often that the administration would not be influenced by the antiwar movement, early with Johnson (June 2, 1965) and into 1970 with Agnew (January 17, 1970). In a memorable quotation reflecting this charge, Secretary Freeman reported President Johnson as having said, regarding the war critics: "I'm just like a jackass in a hailstorm. You just hunker and take it" (April 20, 1967).

8. No responsible alternatives.--The antiwar movement was on occasion attacked as having no responsible alternatives to offer for the policy, as with Johnson (December 13, 1967).

9. Appeal for support.--Regarding VTP, both Nixon and Johnson officials, at various times, defended the administration's policy and appealed for the support of the war critics (Johnson, October 24, 1967; Nixon, October 1, 1969).

10. VTP defended.--There appeared several reported instances of the right to dissent and to criticize the war policy being defended, ranging from McNamara (May 23, 1966) to Nixon (May 9, 1970).

The general thrust of both administrations' treatment of VTP as manifested in the various ways just listed, is to indicate the general importance of the antiwar movement as perceived by the administrations. For the most part, it is indicated that the perception of VTP was negative--yet it was nevertheless apparently seen as significant, at least by virtue of the considerable amount of attention given to it.

From this one might expect some association to exist between administration activity on the war policy itself and antiwar actions in protest of the policy; i.e., as antiwar protests increase, administration activity on the policy also increases. Thus,

Hypothesis 7. For each of the six years and for the overall period, levels of VTP activity did relate significantly to levels of administration activity on the war.

Hypothesis 8. For the overall period, as ADM is lagged with VTP (following VTP), levels of ADM relate significantly with levels of VTP.

For the seventh hypothesis, the results are as follows. Overall, virtually no significant association existed ($r = +0.32$). And in only one year, 1970, did a significant yearly association exist ($r = +0.72$) when, to repeat, high levels for the year for both factors occurred simultaneously from mid-April through June amidst the Cambodian invasion. Here, it could in turn be hypothesized that VTP reacted to the policy (especially KIL, $r = +0.74$ for 1970) and to ADM, and ADM reacted both to the policy (ADM-KIL, $r = +0.44$, for 1970) and to the protest--a complex of interactions all in the furor of the Cambodian invasion. Yet, with this exception of 1970, it must be seen that no support for Hypothesis 7 is forthcoming; for most of the period there was not an apparent association between antiwar protest and administration activity with regard to the policy. Also, with respect to Hypothesis 8, with LAGCOR, there is no support for the idea that ADM subsequent to antiwar protest existed in a significant relationship with

that earlier protest (the "strongest," with a one week lag, r = +0.25).

If, however, one examines the data further, graphically, with special attention to peaks of VTP protest and ADM activity prior to, during and subsequent to the peak of protest, the following is found. In conjunction with some of the sixteen points of very intense VTP activity during the period, some shift in the level of administration activity is apparent; yet these shifts exhibit no consistent style. In five of these sixteen instances, both VTP activity and administration activity increases substantially, simultaneously: August 6-27, 1966, October 14-December 23, 1967, April 27-May 11, 1968, October 4-25, 1969, and May 2-30, 1970. Graphically, the pattern appears as seen in Figure 3, illustrating the period, April 20-May 18, 1968. Also, in the early part of the period there were three instances where VTP peaked, and administration activity dropped substantially: October 9-November 6, 1965, May 21-28, 1966, and July 2-16, 1966. Graphically, Figure 4 illustrates the first of these. Thus, when attention is given to administration activity during the peaks of VTP protest, in at least half of the instances some change in the level of ADM is apparent.

FIGURE 3. Comparison of VTP-ADM for April 20-May 18, 1968



Date	VTP	ADM
Apr. 20	28	7
27	32	7
May 4	46	9
11	10	2
18	15	1

FIGURE 4. Comparison of VTP-ADM for October 2-November 6, 1965



Date	VTP	ADM
Oct. 2	1	6
9	4	5
16	31	3
23	71	1
30	40	6
Nov. 6	35	7

Yet the nature of this change, when it occurs, varies somewhat and does not exhibit any consistent characteristics.

Overall, there seems to be some measure of indication that the antiwar movement was important to both administrations. While this indication is not supported by the existence of any long-term association between the factors VTP and ADM, it does seem to be supported somewhat when periods of intense VTP activity are examined in conjunction with the level of administration statements on the war policy, and additionally by the earlier discussion on administration response to the antiwar movement itself. A seemingly viable conclusion here, then, is that although VTP was of some importance to the administrations, neither administration responded to VTP in any systematic way.

By virtue of the total lack of systematic association between VTP and ADM, with the exception of the year, 1970, the findings of Hypothesis 7 reveal that there is little initial support for the notion that VTP levels were in response to ADM levels. And when VTP is lagged with ADM, i.e., when VTP levels follow ADM levels, the following hypothesis is formulated.

Hypothesis 9. For the overall period, as VTP is lagged with ADM (following ADM), levels of VTP relate significantly with levels of ADM.

With LAGCOR there is no support for this hypothesis--the "strongest" association being, with a one week lag, $r = +0.27$. In line with the earlier discussion when the protest-policy relationship was considered and it was found that (with the possible exception of periods of high rates of United States escalation) there was no significant association between protest and developments in the policy (and several reasons were offered for this), it seems there is some justification for saying here that the development of VTP (with fluctuations in its levels of activity) was independent of the levels of administration statements on the policy. While administration statements (and the war policy) were of genuine concern to VTP, there is considerable support for the view that VTP did not respond to ADM in any systematic way. In the five cases of intense VTP activity where increases in both variables occurred simultaneously, noted above, the majority of these involved VTP activity that had been planned over long periods in advance.

Thus, as a result of the general lack of association between VTP and ADM, there is support for the view

that neither responded to the other in a systematic way. Yet the evidence is apparent that each regarded the other in an important way. For VTP's perception of ADM, this is obvious, as VTP existed in reaction to the war policy which was the result of the administrations' decision-making process. The (perhaps less obvious) importance of VTP in the perceptions of the administrations is also supported, although it seems that the setting forth of some (descriptive and a small amount of quantitative) evidence is necessary for this--such evidence as is provided above in this section.

The Peace Movement and Public Opinion on the War

The peace movement is to be examined finally here as it existed in relation to public opinion on the war; and it is this relationship to which the most importance is attached and to which considerable debate adheres.

There has been a large amount of discussion, with much disagreement, on the "effect" of antiwar protest on public opinion. Two general and contrasting types of views may be illustrated. First, from the Skolnick Report,

> It is important to note that as more of the public learned to accept strikes, they erupted less

> frequently into violent confrontations; the most important factor seems to have been an increased readiness to respond to the issues raised by the strikers rather than merely responding to the act of striking.[15]

Similarly with the Scranton Commission,

> . . . there was growing frustration over the Vietnam war. With each instance of student protest, popular opposition seemed to grow. . . .[16]

In contrast to these statements is the following from a study by Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse, entitled Vietnam and the Silent Majority:

> No matter how the average American may feel about the war in Vietnam, there is one thing on which he is likely to feel certain and strong. This is his opposition to strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of public protest against the war. Indeed, if there is any attribute that has consistently characterized public opinion in the United States, it is its opposition to protest demonstrations of all sorts.[17]

Some of the apparent disagreement here may be resolved by considering further information already existing. First, the Rosenberg et al. statement seems basically accurate. General public opposition to protest existed throughout the period. In another area of its work the Scranton Commission appears to be incorrect in saying that the element of public opposition and backlash first came into being in relation to protest, with the Columbia revolt in the spring of 1968;[18] regarding Berkeley's Free Speech

Movement in 1964, "74 per cent of the adult public in a California poll expressed disapproval of the student demonstrations."[19] Of particular note is a Gallup Poll of early June, 1970, taken in the aftermath of the post-Cambodian invasion student strikes, in which a reported 15 per cent of the public agreed with student strikes as a means of protest and 82 per cent disagreed. By mid-June, 1970, according to Gallup, student protests had replaced the Vietnam war as the "most important problem facing the nation" in the view of the American people.[20] Similar findings on public opposition to protest were made throughout the period; some of the most important were made by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. A survey conducted by SRC in 1968 on public attitudes on "Vietnam war protesters" found the following:

> Nearly 75 per cent of the respondents rated protesters in the negative half of the scale and more than 33 per cent placed them at the extreme negative point. . . . Sixty-three per cent of those believing the war was a mistake viewed protesters negatively, and even of the group favoring complete withdrawal from Vietnam, 53 per cent put the protesters on the negative side of the scale. Plainly, opposition to the war and opposition to active protest against it go together for a significant part of the population.[21]

Initially, then, the statements of the Skolnick Report and the Scranton Commission quoted above are seen as poten-

tially misleading--or, at least, being in need of the development of a perspective which may provide them with a measure of validity. Clearly, though, there was a sizable element of public opposition and backlash to the antiwar protest.

In mid-1970, Converse and Schuman produced an in-depth analysis of public opinion on the war, from which the above quotation on the SRC study was taken. For the most part, they gave very little attention to the peace movement; yet they concluded with this statement:

> These findings . . . lend credence to the proposition that the net effect of vigorous protest in the streets has been to shift mass opinion toward renewed support of the President. On the other hand, the role of highly visible dissent in keeping a wider range of options in the public eye and in encouraging dovish spokesmen in Congress or skeptical commentators in the mass media could be quite real.[22]

And it is the latter part of this statement which accords with the Skolnick and Scranton statements quoted initially here (the former part corresponding with Rosenberg et al.). What seems to emerge then is that both points of view on the relation of VTP to public opinion on the war, listed above, are with some degree of validity.

From this discussion several hypotheses are suggested; the results of testing these may provide further

clarification on the VTP-Opinion relationship.

> Hypothesis 10. For each of the six years and for the overall period, high levels of VTP activity relate significantly to high levels of public opinion favorable to the conduct of the policy.
>
> Hypothesis 11. For the overall period, as public opinion is lagged with VTP activity for short intervals up to three weeks (i.e., opinion following VTP), high levels of VTP activity relate significantly to high levels of public opinion favorable to the conduct of the war policy.
>
> Hypothesis 12. For the overall period, as public opinion is lagged with VTP activity for intervals greater than three weeks (i.e., opinion following VTP), high levels of VTP activity relate significantly to low levels of public opinion favorable to the conduct of the war.

(Public opinion favorable to the conduct of the war policy is composed of three different sets of data: opinion on the "handling of the situation in Vietnam," HAN; presidential popularity [in which the war issue played a key function], PRS; and questions for 1968 on one's own personal classification of himself as either "hawk" or "dove"; as was shown in Chapter II, section D.)

The results of the testing are these. For Hypothesis 10, no significant overall association was found. And in only one individual year was a slight association found. In 1965, an <u>inverse</u> relationship existed between antiwar protest and presidential popularity: high levels

of antiwar protest tended to be associated with lower levels of opinion on presidential popularity and conversely, low levels of VTP tended to be associated with high levels of opinion on presidential popularity ($r = -0.54$). With LAGCOR there is no support for either Hypothesis 11 or Hypothesis 12: no association apparently existed between opinion favorable to the conduct of the war lagged with VTP activity for either short intervals or long intervals; (the strongest association: VTP-HAN, $r = +0.20$, with a one week lag).

Thus, no support seems to be available initially for these hypotheses, which are derived from the general and recent discussion on the protest-opinion relationship. If the various sets of opinion data are correlated with the other factors, a few significant associations are found. Very strong negative associations are found in two years, between opinion and draft calls. In 1965 ($r = -0.80$) high draft calls corresponded to low levels in presidential popularity (and conversely), and in 1969 ($r = -0.88$) low draft calls corresponded with high levels of opinion favoring the "handling of the situation" (and conversely). In one year, 1969, there was a slight association between opinion on handling and casualties

(r = -0.55): low levels of Americans killed corresponded with high levels in opinion favoring the handling of the situation. Interestingly, in two years slight associations existed between opinion and Congressional activity: 1966, opinion on handling and Congressional activity (r = +0.56); 1966, also, presidential popularity and Congressional activity (r = +0.52); and 1969, opinion on handling and Congressional activity (r = +0.51). In one year, 1969, an association existed between acts of support and opinion on the handling (r = +0.63). And negative associations between presidential popularity and Americans killed in action existed overall, where this opinion was lagged with (i.e., followed) KIL at intervals ranging from one to eight weeks (r's, respectively, ranged from -0.50 to -0.55). The Rosenberg et al. study suggests that the news coverage on the war, being increasingly critical probably "reflected and helped to deepen the gradual erosion of the general public's approval of our involvement in Southeast Asia";[23] in two years slight positive associations did exist between the two factors, the strongest being in 1966 with presidential popularity-New York Times (r = +0.49), the opposite of what was expected. From this, it seems, more is to be learned on opinion on the war by looking at

opinion's relationships to factors other than VTP. The findings here will be considered further below.

Of some note, it may be added here, that for the entire six years no support was indicated for an association between protest of a violent and illegal nature and opinion on the war; the "strongest" association, $r = -0.22$, in association with presidential popularity.

The basic thrusts of Hypotheses 10 through 12 may be considered from one further context, however; namely, in terms of the periods of very intense antiwar protest. And in this context, an interesting phenomenon recurs with some frequency. Lending some support to the general idea expressed in Hypothesis 11 (with a short lag of opinion on the war, following VTP, high levels for each factor correspond with each other), is the finding that after nine of the sixteen points of very intense VTP activity, there are immediate rises in (and comparatively high levels of) public opinion favorable to the administrations' war policy. In addition to this, and lending some support to the general idea expressed in Hypothesis 12, in all of these nine instances the high levels of opinion are in turn immediately followed by sharp decreases (comparatively low levels) in the opinion levels favorable to

the war policy. Also lending support to Hypothesis 12 are an additional three of these sixteen instances in which, following a point of intense antiwar protest, opinion favorable to the policy initially stays at about the same level and then shortly thereafter drops to a lower level.

Figure 5 is an illustration of the first of these phenomena taken from early in the period. For the period, October 2 through December 11, 1965, the following weekly levels existed for VTP and opinion on presidential popularity. Here it is seen that although VTP did continue at relatively high levels after mid-October, immediately after the main VTP peak of 71 for the weak ending October 23, PRS increased to 66 (+3 points) by November 6 (two weeks after the peak), and five weeks after this 66 had dropped to the 62 level (-4 points).

Similarly, in an instance later in the period, from October 4 to December 20, 1969, the following occurred (see Figure 6). Here it is seen that presidential popularity was in the process of decreasing slightly (at this time, beginning in September, the war issue had started to regain its former prominence as a factor determining presidential popularity).[24] With the VTP high level of activity, this decreasing trend reversed and by

FIGURE 5. Comparison of VTP-PRS for October 2-December 11, 1965



Date	VTP	PRS
Oct. 2	1	63
9	4	
16	31	
23	71	
30	40	
Nov. 6	35	66
13	27	
20	25	
27	27	
Dec. 4	28	64
11	31	62

FIGURE 6. Comparison of VTP-PRS for October 4-December 20, 1969



Date	VTP	PRS
Oct. 4	45	
11	104	57
18	242	56
25	59	
Nov. 1	47	
8	65	
15	186	68
22	81	
29	30	
Dec. 6	30	
13	30	
20	42	59

the time of the second major peak of VTP activity on November 15 (four weeks after the first peak) presidential popularity increased to the 68 per cent level (the highest per cent of the public favorable to Nixon, achieved in Nixon's term). By December 20, following a little over four weeks of comparatively little VTP activity, presidential popularity decreased rapidly to 59 per cent. This phenomenon of VTP peaks of activity followed by immediate increases and then subsequent drops in opinion favorable to the war policy occurred in a total of nine of sixteen points of VTP peak activity in six years. Other points included December 18, 1965 (VTP-PRS); February 5-12, 1966 (VTP-PRS, VTP-HAN); July 9, 1966 (VTP-PRS, VTP-HAN); April 15-June 3, 1967 (VTP-PRS, VTP-HAN); October 14, December 23, 1967 (VTP-PRS, VTP-HAN); March 9-April 6, 1968 (VTP-PRS); and May 9-30, 1970 (VTP-PRS). The phenomenon similar to this, in which VTP peaks were followed initially by no change in opinion and subsequent to this, a drop in opinion favorable to the war policy--this phenomenon occurred three times: August 14, 1965 (VTP-PRS); April 16, 1966 (VTP-PRS); and August 20-26, 1966 (VTP-HAN).

Thus, in considering periods of VTP peak activity exclusively, in about 56 per cent of these instances, it

is seen that high levels of VTP activity relate to high levels of opinion favorable to the war policy (with short lags of opinion following VTP); and this offers some support for Hypothesis 11 and some confirmation and understanding to the view that protest antagonized the general public and their views on the war. In 75 per cent of the instances of VTP peak activity, high levels of VTP activity relate to low levels of opinion favorable to the war policy with comparatively long lags of opinion following VTP; and this gives support to Hypothesis 12 and again some understanding and confirmation to the Scranton and Skolnick views on the positive effects of protest on the public, quoted above. Thus, there emerges some evidence for a significant association between VTP and opinion on the war policy--an associational type being composed of a very high level of VTP activity, an initial public backlash following the peak, and a subsequent period of rapid decline of opinion favorable to the war policy. It is incidental to note that there is slight variation to both the short-term and the long-term lags.

It is interesting to note additionally that in a sizable majority of the instances, a high level of antiwar protest occurs at a time when opinion favorable to the

policy is decreasing. Of sixteen instances for VTP-PRS, this occurs eleven times; twice, a high level occurs following a period of little change in opinion; and three times, a high level occurs as opinion favorable to the policy is increasing. For VTP-HAN the respective figures are seven, two and three in an overall total of twelve instances. This seems to indicate that direction of public opinion during the period prior to high levels of protest is not especially important to the taking of a high number of protest actions.

The apparent association between the protest movement and public opinion becomes more understandable as the development and composition of opinion on the war is considered during the six years.

Some excellent in-depth analyses of public opinion on the war were made during the period under study. These include ones by Rosenberg et al., Converse and Schuman, and Gallup (all previously cited), and ones by John F. Robinson and Solomon G. Jacobson, Sidney Verba, and Richard Brody.[25] Out of these studies comes some measure of consensus regarding the nature of American public opinion on the war, the main points of which follow.

In their analysis, Robinson and Jacobson conclude with the view that,

> Most Americans are not now [1969] rejecting "war," they merely wish to see this current conflict ended. . . . If the opinion polls show anything, they indicate that this nation tolerates war and war-like conditions with extended patience and unquestioning complacency, but not for indefinite periods with little visible progress.[26]

Along with this conclusion it is important to consider the findings of the Verba et al. study, made early in the period, on American attitudes on the war. Between February and March, 1966, Verba and a team of six others from Stanford University and the National Opinion Research Center conducted an extensive national survey on public opinion on the war in Vietnam. Among their findings were these:

- . . . 88 per cent of all of the people favor negotiations with the Viet Cong.
- . . . 70 per cent would favor a United Nations-negotiated truce.
- . . . 52 per cent would be willing to see the Viet Cong assume a role in a South Vietnam coalition government.
- . . . 54 per cent favor holding free elections in South Vietnam, even if the Viet Cong might win. (And these 54 per cent could identify the Viet Cong.)
- . . . 88 per cent of those who support LBJ's handling of the situation favor negotiations with the Viet Cong, 51 per cent (of the supporters) would accept a coalition government, 54 per cent (of the supporters) favor free elections,

> and 71 per cent (of the supporters) would support a United Nations-negotiated truce.
> . . . Opponents of the President's policy oppose an increase in troop commitment (to 500,000) by 2 to 1 and oppose bombing North Vietnamese cities 3 to 2.
> . . . To finance the war effort, 79 per cent oppose cutting aid to education, 66 per cent oppose raising taxes, and 66 per cent oppose cutting Medicare (these last percentages refer to percentages of all the people).
> . . . 78 per cent of the supporters oppose cutting aid to education.
> . . . On all matters of possible escalation, majorities said they would rather end the war.[27]

These and similar views were held by the American people in 1966; some substantial majority views did tend to be contradictory, which may have reflected the ambiguity of the Vietnam situation.

The American people's basic willingness to accept and support war (Robinson and Jacobson) thus existed alongside their views on United States participation and various contingencies related to a peaceful resolution of the conflict (as found by Verba et al.). This tended to add to the basic instability already existing in American public opinion and mood on issues of foreign policy, a matter analyzed in some detail by Gabriel Almond.[28]

As the period developed, several factors emerged which, according to the general view, adversely affected public opinion favorable to the policy. Prominent among

these according to Gallup was the idea of engaging in a limited war; with the first air raids on North Vietnam, which seemed to get away from the limited nature of the war, the people were initially relieved.[29] With this was the public view, reported by Robinson and Jacobson, strongly favoring military escalation (though not in United States troop levels) and victory-- an opinion frustrated by an official policy "leaning towards a negotiated settlement."[30] Gallup lists additional factors leading to public frustration: fears of China's entry into the conflict, official reports seen subsequently to reflect false optimism (this, in the context of the developing credibility gap), South Vietnamese domestic turmoil, rising casualty figures, and so on. The Skolnick Report reviews a whole process of the development of some of the same and similar factors, as contributing to growing public frustration with the policy.[31] Rosenberg et al. mentions the factor of the war being "perceived by the public as a source of many domestic problems or an impediment to their solution."[32]

In conjunction with all of this, Jacobson and Robinson cite a quotation from Parade magazine, on the views of the typical American, regarding all of these

troubling factors:

> But, bewildered by the spate of information and debate that seems to add up in no clear way, many Chestnut Streeters have simply "turned off" the war. They are troubled but detached from it . . . despite the fact that fellow Americans are fighting and dying in Vietnam.[33]

And with this, importantly, another area of the public opinion is introduced corresponding to Rosenberg et al.'s discussion on the majority of the public's (the mass public's) general confusion on the war issue, their low involvement with it, and their lack of structured opinions regarding it.[34] Rosenberg et al. also speak of basic elements in the process of growing disillusion with the war. Included among these elements are some measure of inconsistency both in terms of affection for and cognition of the policy and a threshold of intolerance for inconsistency which, when attained, results in the change of belief regarding the war.

With respect to the growing proportion of the public opposed to the policy, Converse and Schuman provide a good picture of its composition (a picture later picked up by Rosenberg et al.). They write,

> [The] feeling against the war has consisted . . . of two currents that are widely separated from each other. One current is made up of a tiny fraction of the population, but one that is highly

> educated, articulate, and visible . . . [It is] morally outraged. . . . The other group tends to be less educated than the national average and is much less politically visible, although it is far larger than the set of vocal critics--perhaps by a factor of 10 or more. . . . Most disenchantment with the war seems pragmatic and can be summed up in the attitude that "we have not won and have little prospect of doing so." This simple war-weariness has colored poll results for some time.[35]

The authors point out that this helps to explain the presence of comparatively high levels of opposition to the war and to protest occurring at about the same time. This view on the nature of the opposition is supported by Brody's work; he points out while (as Verba et al. found) in 1966 those who disapproved of the policy favored de-escalation, in 1967 "the disapprovers (now 50 per cent more numerous than in 1966) favored our bombing policy, although still tending to be opposed to more troops and still more in favor of a coalition government than approvers."[36] There was, then, this substantially large pragmatic element in the public opposition to the policy. The presence of this group is reflected in two polls: in 1967 Gallup found 70 per cent opposed to a proposal of a raise in taxes to finance the war and in January, 1970, Harris found only a "bland" general public reaction to the moral issue of the My Lai massacre.[37] Along with this,

Rosenberg et al. write that "the disillusionment with the war ought not to be read as a massive switch of American opinion in favor of the peace movement," and,

> One day an individual might tell an interviewer that the war was indeed a mistake, that he was sick of it, and that he therefore favored pulling out American troops to end it. If the interviewer were to come back a few days later, he would find the same individual still reporting his disillusionment . . . but . . . saying that he would end the war by "bombing the hell out of them."[38]

With all of this material, then, on the composition and nature of public opinion on the war, some clarification is derived on the nature of the protest-opinion relationship. Clearly, several factors independent of the antiwar movement were strongly associated with changes in the levels of opinion on the war. Some of these are slightly apparent in the specific data considered here; i.e., the associations found between opinion measures and draft calls and casualty figures, and so on (all cited above), and other factors, taken into account in other empirical and more descriptive formats, and discussed above (e.g., Skolnick, Gallup, and so on).

The phenomenon of the protest-opinion association, in the context of peak periods of VTP activity, may be seen as more significant in light of this discussion on

public opinion. From the above account it may be noted that the public for the most part was willing to support the nation engaged in war, yet what developed was a style of war to which they were not accustomed nor which they supported. Early, substantial majorities favored a number of possible peaceful resolutions of the conflict, none of which were forthcoming. Gradually, as the period developed, more and more troubling features related to the conflict emerged which required increasing measures of tolerance and acceptance on the part of the public.

It was in the context of all of this that the antiwar movement continually called the public's attention to the war with all of its inherent frustrations; the movement did indeed bear witness to its views on the war, and thereby maintained attention on the nature of the war. The public was thus required to engage in further internal resolution of the war's troubling features; and there were apparent limits to the levels to which the war could be ignored. On a few occasions during the six years, antiwar activity was especially intense. With 75 per cent of these instances there were strong associations of VTP with subsequent low levels of public opinion favorable to the war policy. With this evidence of association, some

support is indicated for the notion that protest had an "effect" on opinion levels favorable to United States military policy in Vietnam. And this association should be seen together with the existence of several other associations of opinion and other factors. Yet it seems, nevertheless, to be an important one.

Footnotes to Chapter V

[1]Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, a Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), pp. 21,22.

[2]William W. Scranton (Chairman), The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (New York: Avon Books, 1971), p. 83.

[3]"The arithmetic mean is defined as the sum of the scores of a variable divided by the total number of valid cases for that variable," Norman Nie et al., Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 272.

[4]Scranton, op. cit., p. 83.

[5]National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility (New York: Award Books, 1969).

[6]Raymond Tanter, "International War and Domestic Turmoil: Some Contemporary Evidence," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 554-556.

[7]Skolnick, op. cit., p. 29.

[8]Ibid., p. 30.

[9]Ibid., p. 31.

[10]Ibid., p. 33.

[11]Ibid., p. 76.

[12]Scranton, op. cit., p. 29.

[13]Tanter, op. cit., pp. 556-559, 566-568.

[14]Ibid., p. 567.

[15]Skolnick, op. cit., p. 23.

[16]Scranton, op. cit., p. 83.

[17]Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 44.

[18]Scranton, op. cit., p. 40.

[19]Skolnick, op. cit., p. 23.

[20]Rosenberg et al., op. cit., p. 44.

[21]Philip E. Converse and Howard Schuman, "Silent Majorities and the Vietnam War," Scientific American, June, 1970, p. 24.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Rosenberg et al., op. cit., p. 10.

[24]Newsweek, October 6, 1969.

[25]John P. Robinson and Soloman G. Jacobson, "American Public Opinion About Vietnam," in Walter Isard (ed.), Vietnam: Some Basic Issues and Alternatives (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing, 1969); Sidney Verba et al.,

"Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," American Political Science Review, June, 1967; Richard Brody, "Vietnam and the 1968 Election: A Preview," Trans-Action, September, 1968.

[26]Robinson and Jacobson, op. cit., p. 79.

[27]Verba et al., op. cit., pp. 317-333.

[28]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), especially, Chapter III, "American Character and Foreign Policy."

[29]George Gallup, "Public Opinion and the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," Opinion Index (American Institute of Public Opinion, October, 1969), p. 7.

[30]Robinson and Jacobson, op. cit., pp. 71-73.

[31]Skolnick, op. cit., pp. 35-57.

[32]Rosenberg et al., op. cit., p. 8.

[33]From J. Rogers, "How the Vietnam War Affects Chestnut Street, U.S.A.," Parade, February 19, 1967, quoted in Robinson and Jacobson, op. cit., p. 78.

[34]Rosenberg et al., op. cit., pp. 11 and 24.

[35]Converse and Schuman, op. cit., p. 24.

[36]Brody, op. cit., cited by Robinson and Jacobson, op. cit., p. 68, footnote 10.

[37]Cited in Rosenberg et al., op. cit., p. 40.

[38]Ibid., pp. 36 and 38.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In summing up this account of the development of the peace movement in the United States, from 1965 through 1970, as it existed in the context of the opinion-policy relationship, the following points may be made.

The peace movement existed in a fundamental relation to three basic entities: United States military policy in Vietnam, the decision-making process which produced the policy, and the people of the United States which offered support for the policy. The characteristics present or lacking in these three relationships have been established as follows.

In relation to the policy, the movement seems for the most part to have existed in order to bear witness to its views on the general phenomenon of the war. Given the presence of the war, the levels of VTP's activity here seemed more to be a function of its own "mood" rather than any particular aspect or development in the war policy,

as indicated by the number of Americans killed in action or by the levels of draft calls for men required to fight in the war. The major exception to this appears to be during two periods of intense American escalation where there are apparent associations between high rates of United States military escalation and high levels of protest activity; the two notable instances of this are the initial escalation period (January-November, 1965) and the Cambodian invasion (May-June, 1970). And thus, some support exists for Tanter's earlier and similar findings. During most of the six years, however, no association is found between VTP and either KIL or DRAFT. Repeating the earlier tautological point, the existence of the antiwar movement was dependent on the existence of the war--and hence, the importance of the war to the movement. With the probable exception of periods of intense escalation in the policy, overall, the movement existed in no apparent association with any special aspect or development in the war policy.

The primary importance of the Johnson and Nixon administrations in the perceptions of the antiwar movement were as producers and perpetuators of the war policy. Apparently, in the perceptions of the administrations,

the antiwar movement was also seen as important. Evidence for this exists in terms of the considerable amount of basic attention given to the movement by both administrations; for the most part, this attention existed in a negative context. And there seems to be additional evidence found in the nature of administration activity during peak periods of protest; some change, albeit unsystematic, is apparent in at least 50 per cent of such instances of intense protest. While it seems that each is important in the perceptions of the other, at the same time neither the administrations nor the movement associates with the other in any consistent or systematic way for any specified period of time during the entire six years.

A potentially significant relationship seems to be present in the association between protest and public opinion favorable to the war. Given the complex and somewhat unstable nature of public opinion on the war, and given the growing number of troubling features of (or related to, or deriving from) the policy which required considerable tolerance on the part of the public, the role of the protest movement--and especially intense periods of protest--in calling attention to the war with all of its frustrations can be seen as having a potentially

important relation to public opinion. And, indeed, this is seen above where in three-fourths of the cases of intense VTP activity, high levels of VTP activity were found to associate with subsequent low levels of public opinion favorable to the war policy. Although this protest-opinion association is seen to exist along with a few other (more expected) associations involving public opinion and such factors as DRAFT and KIL, it seems nevertheless to be an important relationship present in the overall opinion-policy model of Rosenau.

With the examination of these three basic relationships, then, the general importance and significance of the movement begins to emerge. Given the development of the antiwar movement itself over the six years, during which the mean amount of weekly protest per year increased from 14.8 acts per week in 1965 to 38.2 acts in 1970, and given this development in its relations to the other basic entities considered here, it seems that the Skolnick Report's suggestion that antiwar protest has almost acquired the status of an institution in the domestic political system is with some validity. Though the evidence for the importance of the movement does not exist in great quantity, there is nevertheless some evidence for

it; and a good measure of what importance the movement does have in the period seems to derive from its relationship to public opinion on the war.

The fourth major complementing relationship in Rosenau's model involves the opinion-holding (public opinion) and the decision-making processes. While there seems to be little or no evidence of a direct association between VTP activity and changes by the administration towards de-escalation of the policy (with two possible exceptions, considered below), there does seem to be some relationship between low levels of public opinion favorable to the policy and such policy changes of a de-escalatory nature taken by the administration. The significance of the antiwar movement thus derives in part from the generally frequent correlations between high levels of VTP and subsequent low levels of opinion favorable to the war policy--and this, as the latter occasionally exists in relation to steps of de-escalation taken by the administration. High levels of protest tended to exist in relation with low levels of opinion favorable to the war which, in turn, occasionally existed in relation with de-escalatory steps taken by the decision-makers. Descriptively, in the context of Rosenau's model, the flow

appears 9-->6, 7-->8-->1, 2-->10. This "pattern of flow" seems to be that in which the antiwar movement played an especially important role.

A brief exposition is required here on the opinion-administration relationship, specifically concerning the matter of the association between changes in opinion and changes in decision-makers' policy. Although President Johnson and his aides periodically denied that public opinion and various primary and Congressional elections would have any effect on the policy,[1] there are nevertheless several instances in which he and his aides either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged the importance of the public's support of the policy.[2] (Interestingly, and reflecting this generally overall phenomenon, a year after the Johnson regime left office, Johnson admitted that the war had helped drive him from office; less than two months later Rusk denied that the war and public discontent had been a factor in Johnson's decision to pull out.)[3] President Nixon, in contrast, has continually acknowledged the importance of public opinion to the execution of his Vietnam policy, this being reflected somewhat in his use of the symbol "silent majority."[4] In line with this, Rosenberg et al. perceive the opinion-

policy relationship as follows:

> . . . public opinion does influence policy--though not always directly, not always immediately, and not with equal influence exerted by all separate sectors of the general public. . . . Public opinion is a force to be reckoned with not because it offers clear guidelines to the President as to what it desires in the future but rather because it presents the threat to the President that it will react very negatively to past failures. Thus, support for the President goes up after he undertakes a new initiative, no matter what the direction of that initiative. But, having gone up, it soon begins to fade if the results are not as promised.[4]

The considerable importance of the association between public opinion and the decision-making process is generally assumed in the present study. Only this small amount of descriptive material is offered to testify to this importance. And this, consequently, is assumed to insure the validity of the section 8-->1, 2-->10 as a part of a key pattern of flow in the opinion-policy relationship model described above, and thus completing this pattern (9-->6, 7-->8-->1, 2-->10).

Two areas or instances may be pointed to in the course of the development of the movement as cases where elements of the antiwar movement directly "affected" the administration. The most obvious one concerns the post-Cambodian invasion reaction (the magnitude of which was unique and barely credible)[5] and speculation on the

limiting effect this phenomenon had on Nixon's subsequent plans for the Cambodian adventure. Empirical evidence supporting an association between the protest and a possible change in planned policy is lacking, however. The second group of instances concerns elements of the movement whose opposition to the policy was apparently perceived at least with some surprise by President Johnson. When the group which eventually became Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam first marched in protest in front of the White House in 1965, it was reported to the group that the general reaction from the President was one of "what are they doing out there?"[6] Similarly, several instances are reported in which Johnson expressed dismay at the opposition of the intellectual community, a Jewish War Veterans group, a businessmen's association.[7] There is some evidence of an effect on Johnson in cases where people, occupying roles which in the past had traditionally provided support for foreign policies, expressed opposition to the policy and called for de-escalation. Again, however, the systematic empirical evidence for this is not available.

What is thus maintained, with some empirical support, is the general importance of the antiwar movement

as it exists in relation to public opinion which in turn exists in relation to the decision-making process and the policy. Emerging from the six-year period, and apparently existing throughout, is the key patterns of flow of the opinion-policy relationship, noted above. Protest (opinion-submitting) existed largely in relation to public opinion and disillusionment with the course of the war. And public opinion and disillusionment was subsequently perceived by (whether intentionally or not) the decision-making sector--and thus, occasionally low levels of opinion favorable to the war policy were associated with administration steps of de-escalation. Overall, the evidence for the importance of the peace movement is limited; but what evidence does exist seems to be valid.

James Rosenau's model, which has been used here in a modified form in order to provide a descriptive context for examining the war protest movement, may be briefly reconsidered in the light of this overall analysis. Initially, the ability of the model to provide a descriptive context for analysis has been confirmed. Yet, going further, it is evident that certain areas of the model assume a measure of increased importance, as the model itself is considered in the context of the developments

surrounding the antiwar movement. The importance of the pattern of flow, 9-->6, 7-->8-->1, 2-->10, in the model may be seen in the following implications. First, the pattern itself--and its overwhelming predominance in the opinion-policy relationship--has tended to supplant the traditional relationship of classical democratic theory 8-->9-->10. And with this, the role of opinion-submitters has changed significantly: opinion-holders (the general public), much more than ever before, have become the "audience" of the opinion-submitting process. Though opinion-submitting efforts are still directed at the decision-making process, the general public's prominence has increased, if not surpassed, that of the decision-making process in terms of being the object of attention of the opinion submitters (i.e., the relation 9-->6,7 increasing in importance over 9-->10). Here, too, especially notable is the very weak relationship between the opinion-holders and the opinion-submitters via the traditional linkage 8-->9. Though opinion-submitting groups of the protest movement were usually and temporarily made up largely of members of the general public (the opinion-holders), those who were opinion-submitters (temporarily in that role) usually did not have a

specifically designated constituency whose interest they formally represented in their acts of opinion-submission. Again, the dominance of the relationship 9-->6, 7-->8 over the traditional relationship between the two groups 8-->9 tended to prevail. A mutual sense of apartness and alienation thus could be seen between the opinion-submitters and the general public in the context of this linkage. Furthermore, by virtue of this predominant pattern of flow, the somewhat nebulous area termed "climate of opinion" of the opinion-holders assumed considerable importance as a result of both the phenomenon described immediately above (i.e., the general public increasingly becoming the object of attention of opinion-submitters) and its linkage with the decision-making process in terms of its relation to change (or, lack of change) in the war policy of the decision-makers. With these developments in the overall opinion-policy relationship, a number of questions emerge, the answers to which are beyond the scope of this paper but include matters such as the question of ultimate responsibility of the decision-making process when it seems to relate solely to a "climate" of public opinion and questions concerning the proper nature and function of interest articulating groups as they ought

to exist in relation to democratic government. From a secondary perspective, finally, it may be seen that the analysis of the present study has tended to impart some validity to two of the modifications made in Rosenau's model, namely, the expansion and setting forth of the fourth major area of foreign policy and the incorporation of actions in addition to expressed opinions as "flowing units" in the model.

In terms of interest articulation on the foreign policy issue of United States military involvement in Vietnam, it may be seen, to finally conclude, that although the antiwar movement exhibited a considerable magnitude of variety and depth and existed in a series of complex relationships with three basic entities involved with the war issue, its importance was derived largely from its existence in one key pattern of flow in the opinion-policy relationship.

Footnotes to Chapter VI

[1]New York Times, January 28, 1966, June 9, 1966, November 5, 1966, August 1, 1967, April 1, 1968.

[2]New York Times, February 18, 1966, March 4, 1966, March 10, 1966, May 1, 1966, June 10, 1966, June 20, 1966, May 1, 1967, October 8, 1967, October 22, 1967, November 14, 1967.

[3]New York Times, January 27, 1969, March 25, 1969.

[4]New York Times, September 27, 1969, November 5, 1969, May 18, 1970.

[5]Milton J. Rosenberg, Signey Verba, Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 12 and 38.

[6]Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, New York Times, October 3, 1970.

[7]Interview with Gerhard Elson, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, January, 1971.

[8]New York Times, May 12, 1966, September 8, 1966, September 11, 1966, September 23, 1966, May 22, 1967, October 13, 1967.

APPENDIX

DATA TABLE

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
1965													
Jan. 9	2	0	1		5.4	8	10	4	7			71	
16	2	0	0			10	0	8	15				
23	1	1	0			2	0	10	11				
30	1	0	1			2	0	10	11			71	
Feb. 6	2	0	1		3.0	9	10	8	13				
13	6	12	6			14	20	37	42				
20	14	20	4			6	0	21	25				
27	7	1	6			2	0	26	23				
Mar. 6	12	11	4		7.9	10	0	17	26			68	
13	5	10	3			9	0	15	19				
20	8	12	3			10	0	8	13				
27	12	5	1			13	0	13	14			69	
Apr. 3	7	4	3		13.7	13	30	27	30				
10	14	0	1			14	30	29	30			67	
17	10	1	2			12	20	19	24				
24	16	4	5			13	0	23	32				
May 1	13	4	6		15.1	9	30	18	15				
8	12	2	4			7	120	11	10				
15	15	2	2			4	0	10	17			64	
22	16	1	17			9	20	18	20				
29	9	1	2			1	0	9	14				

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Jun. 5	10	2	2		17.0	9	10	13	13				
12	11	3	0			9	46	17	18			70	
19	11	3	3			11	0	22	30				
26	10	1	0	16		5	0	19	13				
Jul. 3	7	2	2	18	17.1	5	0	13	26	48			
10	7	1	0	26		6	0	24	30				
17	12	3	2	23		15	20	19	21	52		69	
24	7	1	2	17		5	20	16	29				
31	10	2	3	9		15	10	21	30				
Aug. 7	17	3	4	3	16.5	14	30	26	30			65	
14	24	1	4	13		10	10	16	22				
21	12	3	4	57		5	10	16	11	57	24		
28	16	1	5	6		5	0	14	14				
Sep. 4	8	1	2	21	27.4	11	0	16	16			65	
11	3	0	6	25		5	0	10	9				
18	6	0	3	29		3	10	14	13				
25	2	0	0	13		2	10	10	9				
Oct. 2	1	0	0	24	31.6	6	1	13	13			63	
9	4	0	0	51		5	0	11	12				
16	31	2	2	42		3	0	9	21	58			
23	71	8	16	14		1	1	15	21				
30	40	0	30	48		6	0	12	20				

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Nov. 6	35	0	23	88	38.35	7	0	10	22			66	
13	27	3	7	89		6	0	14	16				
20	25	2	10	245		6	0	17	19				
27	27	2	11	39		6	0	16	19			64	
Dec. 4	28	2	9	35	40.2	15	0	19	30				
11	31	1	7	99		9	0	20	19			62	
18	43	2	6	36		12	0	11	18				
25	35	3	6	57		12	0	26	26				
1966													
Jan. 1	17	0	2	42	37.28	11	0	30	28				
8	13	2	7	48		5	0	13	18				
15	22	0	4	73		7	20	25	31	56		63	
22	13	3	3	32		15	10	27	26				
29	8	1	2	57		12	20	26	22				
Feb. 5	33	4	7	148	25.4	15	60	42	36			59	
12	27	5	4	104		13	80	29	26			61	
19	21	5	3	96		10	70	26	26	57			
26	22	3	1	141		8	58	24	17				
Mar. 5	19	3	3	141	22.4	8	20	18	16	50		56	
12	19	2	5	100		8	62	18	22		25		
19	9	2	4	81		5	34	14	14				
26	20	4	2	123		6	30	11	9	56		58	

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Apr. 2	20	10	2	101	19.2	3	20	18	22				
9	8	10	1	97		4	0	20	29				
16	29	3	2	89		5	0	24	26	54		57	
23	17	2	2	37		17	0	19	22				
30	13	4	0	70		12	0	17	18				
May 7	16	5	5	82	40.6	7	0	11	14				
14	17	1	0	87		8	10	20	24			54	
21	34	1	1	146		5	10	25	29	47	36		
28	32	10	7	87		8	0	24	24				
Jun 4	19	21	2	109	18.5	8	0	18	19	41		46	
11	17	3	0	143		8	0	8	10				
18	15	5	4	80		7	10	18	23				
25	15	3	1	131		7	10	15	16	40		50	
Jul. 2	18	9	8	118	28.5	16	0	18	22				
9	24	14	6	110		10	0	25	31				
16	8	15	2	66		12	0	14	18	49		56	
23	9	21	4	137		16	10	20	11				
30	9	8	3	99		5	10	16	14				
Aug. 6	9	1	2	71	36.6	7	30	16	17				
13	12	8	4	101		2	20	19	18			51	
20	31	8	1	91		7	0	16	21	43			
27	28	2	9	87		12	0	15	14				

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Sep. 3	10	5	2	74	37.3	7	10	20	17				
10	14	2	2	71		7	0	9	19				
17	17	2	10	96		6	0	10	16	43	35	48	
24	19	4	4	142		13	10	23	17				
Oct. 1	9	1	5	99	49.2	5	10	19	19	42		46	
8	11	5	3	91		7	0	21	20				
15	12	5	4	74		15	0	14	21				
22	15	8	6	64		10	0	16	16				
29	17	8	6	66		10	0	19	30	44		44	
Nov. 5	18	8	9	127	37.6	10	0	11	11				
12	17	7	6	126		8	0	13	9			44	
19	9	10	1	100		5	0	9	12	43	31		
26	11	5	5	143		5	0	9	17				
Dec. 3	11	3	3	44	12.1	3	0	6	9	43		58	
10	22	2	2	83		6	0	13	14				
17	10	4	5	88		14	0	15	20				
24	11	6	2	109		5	0	10	27				
31	19	5	2	128		5	0	29	29	41		46	

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
1967													
Jan. 7	7	2	3	67	15.6	10	20	22	15			47	
14	11	5	4	144		3	0	22	17				
21	16	3	4	123		4	0	17	17	38			
28	20	5	2	131		4	0	20	7				
Feb. 4	23	2	2	117	10.9	6	0	10	13				
11	22	3	3	107		13	0	18	19				
18	19	4	2	172		6	0	17	22	39	32	46	
25	17	10	3	163		10	0	17	20				
Mar. 4	16	2	4	232	11.9	8	0	25	19				
11	10	3	3	175		8	0	17	22				
18	22	1	3	211		8	0	14	16	37		45	
25	9	5	0	274		6	0	28	29				
Apr. 1	24	10	1	194	11.4	3	0	16	17	42		45	
8	22	8	1	177		3	0	25	15				
15	50	11	3	147		2	0	16	9				
22	60	12	7	148		5	20	18	20				
29	46	6	5	181		10	40	20	25	39		46	
May 6	47	9	9	274	18.0	10	0	25	24	43		48	
13	49	10	4	235		6	0	24	27				
20	31	13	11	337		8	0	23	22		37		
27	45	8	6	313		6	0	14	15	38		45	

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Jun. 3	33	2	7	214	19.8	1	0	12	12	43		44	
10	27	2	5	176		1	20	9	5				
17	12	1	3	143		1	10	6	6				
24	21	1	2	274		5	0	14	5	43		52	
Jul. 1	13	3	3	161	19.9	2	0	15	9				
8	17	2	2	282		4	0	15	20				
15	7	1	1	175		3	0	12	14	33	41		
22	14	1	1	164		4	0	10	4				
29	10	2	0	114		1	10	10	7				
Aug. 5	14	1	2	146	29.0	6	30	20	24				
12	16	2	0	82		5	20	22	25			39	
19	23	4	7	108		9	10	22	17	33			
26	21	4	4	125		6	30	21	22				
Sep. 2	17	1	6	157	25.0	6	20	27	22				
9	17	2	6	242		6	0	37	22				
16	18	0	1	236		8	0	9	17			39	
23	16	2	5	128		8	0	18	16				
30	24	2	5	141		8	0	18	20				
Oct. 7	18	3	6	102	17.0	1	28	22	22				
14	35	4	6	171		5	50	22	18				
21	65	4	5	193		7	0	25	19		46	38	
28	93	10	15	166		5	14	23	26				

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Nov. 4	55	4	4	178	22.0	6	20	13	15				
11	37	0	7	177		7	32	12	14			41	
18	63	5	4	225		16	40	28	19	35			
25	40	5	4	212		2	0	15	15				
Dec. 2	52	4	6	207	18.2	8	10	20	11				
9	49	1	5	194		11	0	20	15				
16	39	0	6	187		11	10	13	15	40	45	46	
23	31	1	2	166		10	0	21	19				
30	21	5	2	185		9	0	27	19				
1968													
Jan. 6	27	1	2	184	34.0	10	0	21	19				
13	29	7	1	278		10	0	12	20	39		48	56-28
20	42	3	1	218		11	0	22	20				
27	29	4	1	203		9	0	12	10				
Feb. 3	25	3	1	416	23.3	10	0	30	29		46		61-23
10	27	9	1	400		5	10	32	34				
17	32	3	3	543		10	0	28	35	35	48		
24	21	11	4	470		8	0	36	34				58-26

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Mar. 2	26	5	2	542	41.0	9	10	23	25			41	
9	49	4	2	509		1	0	24	24				
16	49	9	2	336		8	40	29	21		49		41-42
23	49	10	9	349		9	10	28	28				
30	47	15	5	330		8	20	20	22			36	
Apr. 6	42	1	5	279	48.0	23	0	39	31				
13	23	6	2	363		13	20	20	20		48		41-41
20	28	2	0	287		7	0	24	20			49	
27	32	7	0	302		7	0	18	22				
May 4	46	7	2	383	45.9	9	10	23	25			46	
11	10	2	1	562		2	0	30	25				
18	15	1	0	549		1	0	21	28				
25	29	0	0	426		0	0	15	20			41	
Jun. 1	22	1	1	438	20.0	1	0	12	13				
8	24	4	0	380		1	0	10	8				
15	26	0	0	324		1	0	13	10			42	
22	14	0	0	299		0	10	12	14				
29	18	3	0	187		2	0	13	7				
Jul. 6	20	6	0	198	15.0	0	0	12	12				
13	16	3	0	188		3	0	10	11				
20	15	0	0	157		7	0	12	14			40	
27	9	4	0	193		3	0	9	10				

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Aug. 3	9	0	1	171	18.3	6	0	13	8				
10	7	0	2	173		0	0	9	6				
17	11	2	3	159		2	0	24	24		53		
24	35	0	4	308		3	0	23	17				
31	106	1	0	408		5	0	21	11			35	
Sep. 7	97	1	2	195	12.2	2	0	8	7				
14	46	0	1	217		4	1	11	5				
21	39	0	1	290		3	0	5	15				
28	40	1	1	247		8	10	11	7				
Oct. 5	32	1	0	190	13.8	2	0	12	12			42	44-42
12	31	1	2	177		3	0	10	10				
19	21	6	0	100		4	0	11	16		54		
26	21	8	0	109		2	0	13	23				
Nov. 2	32	8	0	150	10.0	4	0	29	25				
9	22	3	0	166		1	0	16	13				
16	22	0	0	127		3	0	17	14			43	
23	12	4	0	160		1	0	9	6				
30	11	4	0	228		0	0	9	12				
Dec. 7	46	4	0	192	17.5	3	0	8	10				
14	17	0	0	222		1	0	9	7				
21	20	0	0	151		1	0	4	16			44	
28	17	1	1	113		0	0	10	6				

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
1969													
Jan. 4	10	0	0	101	26.8	0	0	9	10				
11	13	1	0	151		1	0	6	10			LBJ 49	
18	3	1	0	196		5	0	14	10			NIX 59	
25	16	0	0	190		6	0	7	7				
Feb. 1	9	2	0	198	33.7	5	0	9	6				
8	16	0	0	183		0	0	4	3				
15	10	2	0	197		2	0	2	2			61	
22	13	2	0	164		1	0	11	3				
Mar. 1	20	3	0	453	33.1	2	0	11	6				
8	18	0	1	336		3	0	16	15				
15	19	3	0	351		6	0	12	8	44		65	
22	26	1	0	266		5	0	9	10				
29	26	1	1	312		3	0	11	10			63	
Apr. 5	25	0	1	222	33.0	2	0	9	2				
12	26	2	1	204		5	0	9	10				
19	21	0	0	216		5	0	6	3	44		61	
26	21	0	0	163		3	0	3	1				
May 3	18	2	1	205	27.6	0	0	7	6			64	
10	18	0	0	184		7	0	6	14				
17	17	2	0	430		13	0	14	12	48		65	
24	10	1	2	265		6	0	12	7				
31	14	0	1	261		5	0	10	3			65	

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Jun. 7	20	1	0	252	25.9	4	0	16	16				
14	26	0	1	335		6	0	19	14	52		63	
21	18	1	1	247		3	0	9	10				
28	15	0	1	241		2	20	12	9				
Jul. 5	17	3	1	153	22.3	3	0	9	5				
12	14	1	2	148		1	0	9	14				
19	8	0	0	182		5	0	5	0	53		58	
26	8	0	0	110		2	0	5	0			65	
Aug. 2	4	2	1	139	29.5	7	10	11	11				
9	17	0	0	96		2	0	10	4				
16	18	2	0	244		3	0	10	5	54		62	
23	17	0	1	190		2	0	9	6				
30	11	0	0	185		7	0	11	12				
Sep. 6	10	0	3	137	29.0	6	0	16	14				
13	10	1	0	143		13	0	12	7	45		60	
20	32	0	0	135		6	0	16	12			58	
27	32	0	2	95		2	0	15	7	52			
Oct. 4	45	3	4	64	10.0	6	0	11	10				
11	104	2	3	82		9	0	14	10			57	
18	242	1	12	78		14	4	24	16	58	58	56	
25	59	2	5	102		13	0	7	13				

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Nov. 1	47	0	4	83	10.0	2	0	8	2				
8	65	1	15	97		6	31	18	19				
15	186	3	34	113		3	30	18	18	64		68	
22	81	6	19	130		8	110	19	13				
29	30	4	9	70		9	20	16	13				
Dec. 6	30	4	8	100	9.0	4	129	14	11				
13	30	2	10	85		4	40	7	9			59	
20	42	4	4	66		8	10	14	5				
27	14	1	3	86		4	0	7	13				
1970													
Jan. 3	22	3	2	65	12.5	4	0	8	7			61	
10	18	4	0	98		1	0	9	5				
17	23	5	1	84		4	0	3	4	65	57	63	
24	20	1	3	75		3	0	4	3				
31	21	3	4	70		6	0	3	6			66	
Feb. 7	19	0	2	95	19.0	6	50	9	6				
14	21	1	0	96		7	11	4	5	53			
21	38	0	2	83		4	52	8	8				
28	34	0	0	113		1	0	4	3			56	

DATA TABLE (COntinued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Mar. 7	21	0	0	88	19.0	2	50	3	4				
14	11	0	0	101		4	0	4	3	47	58		
21	26	0	0	110		1	30	12	5			53	
28	13	0	0	79		5	10	7	6				
Apr. 4	23	0	1	138	19.0	7	0	9	7				
11	22	1	2	141		4	40	8	7				
18	44	2	2	101		3	50	5	3	46	51	58	
25	36	0	0	94		8	21	9	10				
May 2	64	4	8	123	15.0	18	98	19	19	53		57	
9	264	7	14	168		27	36	61	44				
16	260	4	14	217		22	50	38	16		56		
23	133	0	20	142		16	20	24	11				
30	99	0	21	165		17	0	22	16			59	
Jun. 6	86	3	3	119	15.0	9	30	14	10				
13	73	7	9	130		10	78	23	12				
20	44	3	6	80		10	1	14	8			55	
27	48	0	5	104		12	10	14	13				
Jul. 4	36	2	5	61	15.0	7	10	13	17				
11	34	2	3	72		12	20	7	6			61	
18	22	7	3	66		11	10	10	7				
25	14	3	2	77		4	0	5	5			55	

DATA TABLE (Continued)

Week Ending	VTP	FOR	SUP	KIL	DRAFT	ADM	CON	NYT	LAT	Opinion HAN	MIS	PRS	HK-DV
Aug. 1	16	1	3	78	10.0	6	0	3	4	55			
8	21	1	3	85		4	0	2	6				
15	23	1	0	69		0	10	2	2				
22	19	1	5	52		2	10	10	6				
29	20	0	1	63		9	0	9	3			56	
Sep. 5	32	1	11	87	12.0	4	0	10	3				
12	24	1	7	54		3	0	2	2				
19	22	1	6	52		5	0	8	4				
26	24	1	5	63		8	0	2	0				
Oct. 3	23	1	5	38	12.0	5	0	2	1				
10	21	3	2	46		18	31	12	11			58	
17	15	1	1	40		8	10	4	6				
24	14	2	0	43		10	0	5	0				
31	14	2	0	24		3	0	0	4				
Nov. 7	19	0	1	31	8.0	3	0	5	7				
14	20	3	0	32		3	0	7	5			57	
21	11	2	0	65		6	0	6	6				
28	11	0	0	32		16	40	19	23				
Dec. 5	21	0	0	27	7.0	7	20	11	17			52	
12	4	1	0	29		9	27	7	7				
19	10	1	0	23		7	22	4	4				
26	13	2	0	41		3	10	4	9				

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